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Employees Losing Power, Losing
Jobs: Making the Case for Mediating

Power in the Era of Buy-ins and
Bailouts
LoValerie Mullins*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Market economics of the last few decades has rallied modem American
workplace management around a global corporate power initiative, operating
through the phenomenon of corporate self-regulation, often defined as the
"coordination of internal or 'self-regulatory' compliance structures with the
external law of the workplace." 1 Self-regulation is the newest paradigm for
internal management of private sector workplace ethics. As such, it is an
amalgam of social, legal, and business trends combining to orchestrate the
appearance of pioneering efforts toward corporate compliance with industry
standards and legal norms of ethical business management. In reality, this
amalgam of trends is a primary mechanism in the advancement of economic
globalization and a veneer covering diminished employee protections
worldwide.
As a mechanism of globalization, self-regulation anchors the modem
American employment experience, labeled by scholars as the era of the
"boundaryless workplace." 2 In the boundaryless workplace, the private

* The author is a graduate of the University of Missouri Dispute Resolution Program, LL.M., and of
the Appalachian School of Law. I would like to thank Professor Philip Harter for his professional
guidance in this project. My efforts herein are for the benefit of employees in the American
workplace, and for Raleigh Marshall, Caileadair, Justine, Francis, Lois, Jozie, and Kealie, America's
future, to whom I say, advocate your world.
1. Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of Self-Regulation, 105
COLUM. L. REv. 319, 321 (2005).
2. See Katherine V.W. Stone, The New Psychological Contract: Implications of the
Changing Workplace for Labor and Employment Law, 48 UCLA L. REv. 519, 553-54 (2001);
Michael B. Arthur, The Boundaryless Career:A New Perspectivefor OrganizationalInquiry, 15 J.
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 295 (1994).
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sector has dismantled conventional employment norms and replaced them
with a self-regulating or self-help 3 framework of values: emphasizing
sustainable governance and profitability. With the events of dramatic
corporate deregulation and business reforms of market economics, the selfhelp ethos results ultimately in a shift away from employee protection. This
is apparent from the constraint of employment expectations and the broad
purging of employee benefits and legal safeguards from private enterprise.
Scholars commonly describe these changes as a natural boundaryless
evolution in the employment dynamics of the modem workplace. To some
commentators, "this shift may be seen as part of a larger democratization of
the American workplace
that is being fueled by many economic, cultural[,]
4
and other factors."
The appearance of democratization in the private sector is deceiving,
however, and when analyzed from a private workforce perspective, the
reality is that self-regulation of private enterprise has not become its
democratization. In fact, another reality emerges, which is that boundaryless
shifts in employment dynamics show unmistakable signs of an increasingly
distressed employment system, clearly illustrated by issues like employee
transience, benefits reductions, and, less visibly, employment grievance
restrictions.
The human effect of America's distressed employment system is
perhaps best illustrated by a growing surge in boundaryless workplace
dispute.
Effectively, distress inherent in boundaryless employment
dynamics has created a natural breeding ground for workplace conflict,
conflict which has increasingly materialized into open dispute. For example,
it has been reported that an average of 81,000 charges of employment
discrimination, alone, have been filed with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) each year over the last decade. 6 Another
report illustrates that over the last thirty years employment litigation has
grown at a rate almost ten times greater than that of all other types of civil

3.

Orly Lobel, The Paradox of Extralegal Activism: Critical Legal Consciousness and

Transformative Politics, 120 HARV. L. REV. 937, 972 (2007). "Self help" is a term loosely inferred
here and expounded upon by the author's description of contemporary transformative politics as a
paradox to true social reform.
4. See Richard C. Reuben, Democracy and Dispute Resolution: Systems Design and the New
Workplace, 10 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 11,13-14 (2005).

5.

See Charles B. Craver, The Use of Non-Judicial Procedures to Resolve Employment

Discrimination Claims, 11 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 141, 141-42 (2001); see also Ellen Dannin,
NLRA Values, Labor Values, American Values, 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 223, 259 (2005);
Thomas C. Kohler, The Employment Relation and Its Orderingat Century's End: Reflections on
Emerging Trends in the UnitedStates, 41 B.C. L. REV. 103, 106 (1999).
6. Anne Noel Occhialino & Daniel Vail, Why the EEOC (Still) Matters, 22 HOFsTRA LAB. &

EMP. L.J. 671, 704 (2005) (citing EEOC Charge Statistics FY 1992 Through FY 2004).
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litigation.7 One commentator added claims filed in courts with other
administrative agencies to describe statistical growth rates at roughly
twenty-three percent increase each year,8 ultimately reminding observers
that distress is present and far reaching.
These numbers suggest that deliberative democratic practices are not
present in the work environment or are not functioning adequately if they are
present. The result is such that in the vacuum of deliberative democratic
practice, today's employees are losing rights through corporate compliance
rhetoric, losing standing as workplace citizens, and ultimately losing the
power-base needed to negotiate their professional lives. Put simply,
systemic distress has forced increasing numbers of employees into
frustration, angst, and into dispute, arguably in rejection of their status as
marginalized professionals in the American workplace. How is this most
likely occurring?
The self-regulating machine of modem private enterprise is increasingly
autonomous, virtually global, and very powerful, representing a dominant
force against which grieving employees are poorly matched, and against
which conventional dispute management tools are inadequate in their ability
to meaningfully resolve workplace dispute. Much inadequacy is due to the
inability of facilitative methods of dispute resolution to manage issues of
power disparity experienced between parties to boundaryless workplace
grievances. Practices lacking specific pedagogy for addressing power
disparity in the new workplace and the absence of genuine tools for
resolving hierarchy issues leave critical holes in current private sector
employment dispute resolution design. In a fundamental way, practical
failure to address power disparity in boundaryless work environments is the
failure to stop the collapse of employees' power-base from the American
workplace.
A most certain consequence is the ultimate failure of
deliberative democratic practices in the private business sector itself.
This article proposes that dispute in the workplace is the best illustration
of the loss of equanimity boundaryless employees experience in their work
environment, and further, that dispute systems design necessitates a power
neutralizing approach for mediating struggles caused by power disparity
present in today's private employment relationships. To that end, my goal is

7. Stephen F. Befort, Labor and Employment Law at the Millenium: A Historic Review and
CriticalAssessment,43 B.C. L. REv. 351, 399-400 (2002).
8. Allison Balc, Making It Work at Work: Mediation's Impact on Employee/Employer
Relationships and MediatorNeutrality, 2 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 241, 241 (2002).
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to provide an employee-centered perspective of self-regulated employment
policy in America, and to demonstrate the degree of conflict (and eventual
disputation) such policy creates for boundaryless workforces.
Ultimately, I make the case for an evolved dispute resolution process
more able to manage power disparity in modem private workplace issues.
My reasoning is based on the view that "organizational structure affects
interpersonal dynamics, the languages of power, and available means and
procedures" 9 for addressing that power. Therefore, Part II analyzes current
trends in the self-regulating workplace by comparing cooperative enterprise
models with the structures of boundaryless corporations. Part III evaluates
the new workplace for evidence of democratization in the private sector.
Part IV addresses the self-regulating, or "self-help," framework of values
found in the new workplace. Part V contrasts the self-regulating framework
of values with conventional goals of deliberative workplace democracy.
Part VI describes the ease with which conflict is created in the power-based
environment of today's private sector.
Finally, Part VII makes the case for an evolution in dispute resolution
theory toward the practice of mediating issues of power disparity as a
deliberative function of workplace dispute resolution design. Efforts in this
regard are somewhat hazardous since the topic of mediating power
imbalance touches on strictly taboo practices in the field of conventional
However, with global changes in
facilitative dispute resolution.1 °
employment dynamics omnipresent in today's private enterprise
environments, mediating issues involving power imbalance is a practice
whose time has necessarily come. Winning over the mediator practitioner,
though, most likely requires an instructive "big picture" overview of the
boundaryless employment experience, starting with a survey of corporate
trends affecting employees in the self-regulating American workplace.
II.

SURVEYING CORPORATE TRENDS IN THE SELF-REGULATING
WORKPLACE

For the American workforce, reform is in the air. 1 "Globalization has
broadened the field of competition.., forcing companies to pay ever greater

9. Elizabeth A. Hoffmann, Dispute Resolution in a Worker Cooperative: FormalProcedures
and ProceduralJustice, 39 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 51, 53 (2005).
10. See generally Kimberlee K. Kovach & Lela P. Love, Mapping Mediation: The Risks of
Riskin's Grid,3 HARv. NEGOT. L. REV. 71, 76 (1998).
11. Estlund, supranote 1, at 321.
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attention to the bottom line. 12 Over the last few decades, the private
employment experience has radically changed to accommodate this bottom
line. Essentially, employees have become "free agents operating in a free
talent market,' ' 13 expedient personnel moving as markets move. From
contingent employees, private consultants, and contractors, to undocumented
workers, the scope of nontraditional employment arrangements in the new
workplace has created offices without walls and careers without ladders.
Down-sizing and out-sourcing are tangible illustrations of this new global
experience; corporate buy-ins and industry bailouts, its result.
With varying degrees of skepticism, scholars have generally hailed selfregulation as an improvement in the quality of the private employment
experience. Many have agreed, "The new workplace is far more attuned to
the interests of the employees.' 4 Further, the new boundaryless workplace
boasts increased democratic activity, the look of which is lauded as "more
vibrant and egalitarian."' 5 To some commentators, "this shift may be seen
as part of a larger democratization of the American workplace that is being
fueled by many economic, cultural, and other factors." 6 In fact, recent
academic literature draws functional parallels between what is essentially
cooperative workforce democracy and new employment frameworks
embedded in the self-regulating workplace. 7 Moreover, scholars have
reinterpreted the value of work itself along free market parameters.
Commentators have argued that looking solely at economic factors like
salaries and promotions as indicators of employee success diminishes the
positive reaches of democratic practices in the new workplace. 18 Essentially,
these theories frame employee success in the boundaryless workplace
through relational measures rather than economic ones. One such frame is
the "new psychological contract" between employer and employee in which
the employee garners psychological and relational benefits apart from

12. Vivian Berger, Employment Mediation in the Twenty-First Century: Challenges in a
ChangingEnvironment, 5 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 487, 490 (2003).
13. Katherine V.W. Stone, Employee Representation in the Boundaryless Workplace, 77 CHI.KENT L. REv. 773, 774 (2002) (citing BRUCE TULGAN, WINNING THE TALENT WARS: HOW TO
MANAGE AND COMPETE IN THE HIGH-TECH, HIGH-SPEED, KNOWLEDGE-BASED, SUPERFLUID
ECONOMY 155-57 (2001)).
14. Reuben, supra note 4, at 19.
15. Id. at 12.

16.

Id. at 13.

17.
18.

See id. at 17-40.
Seeid. atl7-31.
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salary.1 9 Another frame measures success by the corporate use of new
management styles such as flattened hierarchies and work teams. 20 As a
result, scholars have claimed "the new workplace is structured more as a
partnership, with employers and employees as mutual stakeholders.,, 21 As
such, employees can expect "greater recognition of [employee] needs,
interests, and concerns... beyond mere economics., 22 Scholars tend to
agree. Improved employee management is the result of the work of more
democratic workplace models in the self-regulating work environment.23 In
sum, deliberative labels and democratic descriptors dot the academic
literature with illustrations of bold innovations in the way businesses
manage boundaryless workforces.
In reality, bold employment innovations, governed by an era of market
economics, have openly assaulted the democratic fabric of working
America. Effects of the assault are palpable. Americans read about raids on
manufacturing plants to recover undocumented workers, while they
themselves cannot find employment. Households experience language
barriers trying to install varied communication services managed by foreign
call centers even though corporate offices are located only blocks away. The
rising price of gas sends oil companies into America's protected
wildernesses and forces airlines to stop serving free meals on eighteen hour
transatlantic flights. The stock market goes up when employment numbers
go down, and the value of the dollar drops to the benefit of everyone but the
American worker. The result, in an age of markets, is that an America who
historically worked to prosper, now, just works. So what is the age of
markets?
The answer is central to understanding the employment
experiences of today's private sector.
A.

The Age of Markets

The current age of market economics is broadly described as an era of
finance-driven industry competition, the primary goal of which is wealth
maximization. Market economics is generally applauded for the growth of
American entrepreneurship, expanded career opportunities for minorities
and women, and for highly advanced global business technologies.24
19. ld. at 19.
20. See id. at 17.
21. Id. at 19.
22. See id. at 20.
23. See id. at 27-40.
24. See generally Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Age of Aquarius or, How I (Almost) Learned to
Stop Worrying and Love Free Markets, 88 MINN. L. REV. 921, 922-23 (2004) (reviewing
RAGHURAM

G.

RAJAN

&

LUIGI

ZINGALES,
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Theoretical scholarship tends to attribute the appearance of a more inclusive
workforce with minorities, women, and entrepreneurs as a sign of improved
democratic activity in the workplace.25 Broadened opportunity also signifies
to many the end of an autocratic age of management hierarchy. According
to Orly Lobel, many management scholars believe hierarchical management
systems of the past have caused the "most serious problems facing corporate
organizations." 6 Yet, with the change in corporate landscape, "the
dominance of finance over management that characterizes the last twenty
years has led to deal making on a grand scale... moving assets from hand
to hand in order to make investment bankers and management/stockholders
rich."27 In effect, "the concentration of capital [that market theory] has
encouraged creates perverse managerial incentives and is itself
28 an inchoate
political force that has the potential to be highly destabilizing.,
Essentially, "[t]he destabilizing effects of the transformation from
hierarchy to market litter the human landscape of twenty-first century
America., 29 Now more than ever "[c]oncentrations of wealth[] translate[]
into concentrations of power"30 where "a market composed of investors who
have incentives to punish corporations that do not keep their prices rising is
a market composed of corporate managers who have incentives to fudge. 3 1
The critical problem in the age of markets is that we have yet to develop appropriate
norms, rules, and social structures to accompany it, social structures that are necessary to
bring some stability and order, some measure of confidence and safety, some assurance
and hope, to the volatile and chaotic market
of fair play,•'.some .reason for .optimism
32
live.
environment in which we now

an "ethic of fear is the dominant social
Without these assurances
33
psychological result.,

UNLEASHING THE POWER OF FINANCIAL MARKETS TO CREATE WEALTH AND SPREAD OPPORTUNITY

(2003)).
25. Id.at 923.
26. Orly Lobel, Agency and Coercion in Labor and Employment Relations: Four Dimensions
ofPower in Shifting Patternsof Work, 4 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 121, 169 (2001).
27. Mitchell, supra note 24, at 943.
28. Id.at 931.
29. Id.at 946.
30. Id.at 930 (emphasis added).
31. Id. at931.
32. Id.at 949.
33. Id.at 948.

529

Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2010

7

Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 10, Iss. 3 [2010], Art. 5

The "Ethic of Fear

B.

34

Lawrence Mitchell, Professor at George Washington University Law
School, has coined an essential phrase for understanding the nature of the
current labor market and the psychology behind its control. He terms the
current relationship between employment principles and today's market
economy as an "ethic of fear., 35 Mitchell defines "ethics" as "the way we
interact with others, and the ways in which we restrain ourselves from
pursuing our self-interest to the detriment of others.

36

The "ethic of fear,"

on the other hand, "is a fear born of unstructured, flexible, irregular,
uncertain,... transformation from the age of hierarchy to the age of
markets., 37 The ethic of fear "translates into an ethic of self-protection, in
our laws, our rules, our norms, and our institutions. 38 Ultimately, "the ethic
of self-protection is the ethic of the market, ' 39 and "by itself knows no social
harmony.

4°

Mitchell characterizes the lack of harmony inherent in today's market
economy as "apathy, rationalization, justification, and exculpation, leading
to distrust, detachment ...and ultimately communal disintegration.", 41 If
this is the case, then recent corporate bankruptcies like Lehman Brothers,
industry-wide collapse such as the "big three" auto makers, and government
bailouts of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and AIG (to name just a few) readily
reflect a full-scale emaciation of workplace ethics in America's private
sector enterprise. In effect, employment ethics in the private sector have
been replaced by a psychology of fear and self-preservation called the
"survival imperative."42
'
By the beginning of the twenty-first century, the collapse of the stock market as well as

the deep and continuing recession in the American economy ...have left
4 3 us with a freefor-all market environment in which the survival imperative dominates.

Arguably, the survival imperative was foremost on the minds of
lawmakers during continual governmental efforts to bailout AIG; perhaps
best illustrated when officials described the insurance giant as simply "too

34.

See id. at 944.

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id.
Id. at951.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 952.
Id.at 950.
Id.at 952.
Id.at 948.
Id.(emphasis added).

530
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big to fail." 44 Current trends in corporate self-regulation illustrate the
survival imperative hard at work ensuring that failure is no longer an option
for modem American private enterprise. Assuring that corporations no
longer fail, however, is perhaps the most perilous of capitalism's ambitions.
For corporate entities, the power of infallibility means sovereignty itself, and
with sovereignty, corporate conglomerates have the power to control the
world's economy, which means the power to control world employment.
Efforts toward sovereignty inherently begin with industrial self-regulation,
where power amasses one policy at a time.
C. Corporate Trends in Self-Regulation-PowerAmasses

Self-regulation embodies striking shifts in corporate policy and business
from the last few decades. Corporate movement toward self-regulation is
apparent in the radical decline in employment numbers within the unionized
employment sector4 5 and in the general shift in the American workforce
from blue-collar to white-collar employment 6 With respect to the birth of
corporate regulatory sovereignty, of which these movements are a part, four
specific trends have merged together to create the self-regulating paradigm
that shapes the private workplace environment today. They are: (1) the renorming of employment law using practices of reform opportunism, (2) the
adoption of regulatory bilateralism through negotiated governance
processes, (3) a heavily incentivized privatization of employment law, and
(4) the autocratization of the deliberative justice ethos, essentially, the
insurgence of private ordering into deliberative justice models. The merging
of these trends has a profoundly negative effect on the modem employment
experience, particularly since corporate initiatives easily unfold outside the
specter of public scrutiny or legal review via opportunistic behavior on the
part of private enterprise.

44. See Lucian Bebchuk, AJG Still Isn't Too Big to Fail,THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, Mar.
20, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123751263240591203.html; see Bill Saporito, How AIG
Became
Too
Big
to
Fail,
TIME,
Mar.
19,
2009,
http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1886275,00.html.
45. See Befort, supranote 7, at 361-62.
46. Id. at 364.
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1. Trend 1: Reform Opportunism Re-norms Employment Law
Extralegal activism can be described broadly as varying means by which
social change is created without the use of legal procedure, either by
community action or private special interest organizing.47 Rallying political
action groups, training lobbyists and organizers, and "prepar[ing] groups for
political confrontation,"48are some examples of extralegal activism. 4 9 In
more specific terms, extralegal activism "eliminate[s] the need for reliance
on the lawyer's specialized legal knowledge ' 50 or the use of organized legal
process, turning instead to the political power of interest groups to create
policy change rather than legal precedent.51 Arguably, extralegal activism
was born from a need to implement social goals when courts could not.
Courts adjudicate by nature, but, institutionally, they are not adequate
enforcers of their own judgments; they are not "self-executing." 52 "[C]ourts
lack the capacity, power, and information to oversee the implementation of
their decisions. 53 Moreover, scholars suggest that litigation simply fails to
"produce lasting social consequences. 54 Hence, policy change may tend to
invoke better implementation and enforcement of newly advocated norms
than does legal precedent.55 Ultimately, the more ineffective the legal
system appears at dealing with specific interests, the more attractive
alternatives become for generating reform.
Two things tend to occur when activism or "mobilization" 56 leads
reform: litigation tends to diminish in lieu of social change, which means
legal standards tend to loosen their application or to fade against more
visible social agendas." In this process, law enforcement shifts into a
restorative mode and away from traditionally retributive functions.5 8 In
other words, policy shifts invite legal flexibility and prevention-oriented

47. See Lobel, supranote 3, at 942.
48. Id. at 960 (paraphrasing Stephen Wexler, PracticingLaw for Poor People, 79 YALE L.J.
1049, 1056-58 (1970)).
49. Id. at 959.
50. Id. at961.
51. Id. at960-61.
52. Id. at 954.
53. Id.
54.

Id.

55.
56.
57.
58.

Id.
Id.at 960.
See generally id.
See id.

532
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controls into law enforcement processes, leading to the demise of
punishment-oriented solutions.5 9
Through reform initiatives and strategic mobilization at the corporate
level, private enterprise builds flexibility in resolving legal issues
surrounding unlawful behavior, and companies ultimately become less
fearful of punitive measures against misconduct. Special interest organizing
and policy agendizing become increasingly appealing to corporate entities
who are themselves creatures of powerful special interest advocacy.6 °
Essentially, the partnering of self-regulation with special interest
advocacy tends to invite what I call "reform opportunism" into law
enforcement, particularly with respect to policy formation. Reform
opportunism is the private negotiation of public law for the purported
purpose of streamlining law enforcement efforts. In this process, extralegal
methods of corporate law enforcement such as policy initiatives, codes of
conduct, and grievance processes, are streamlined into the legal regulation of
a company and ultimately control the nature of law enforcement within the
company. The pursuit of opportunistic reform protects corporate policy and
those who make it-generally, by targeting law breakers on an
administrative level rather than a legal one. Thus, offending CEOs are often
fired instead of jailed, and whistleblowers rarely pierce the proverbial
corporate veil.
2.

Trend 2: Negotiated Governance Results in Regulation Bilateralism

Kimberly Krawiec uses the term "negotiated governance" 61 to describe a
general model of government regulation which gives voice to those groups
being regulated 62 through "cooperative governance methods ' 63 of
compliance. In the private sector, negotiated governance adds corporate
voice to the mechanics of regulatory compliance by testing interpretations of
regulatory language in two specific ways.64 First, companies individualize
regulatory schemes through "gap filling." 65 Gap filling adds context and, in

59.

See id.

60. Mitchell, supra note 24, at 932.
61. Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failureof Negotiated Governance,
81 WASH. U. L.Q. 487, 489 (2003).
62.
63.

Id.at 490.
Id.

64.
65.

See id at 522-33.
Id.at 494.

533
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some cases, content to otherwise incomplete law in ways which maximizes
the probability of corporate compliance with touched-up or filled-in
regulation policy. 66 Undoubtedly, the hodgepodge process of some
incremental lawmaking almost requires private gap filling for real time
implementation.67 Second, a new line of corporate professionals, or what
Krawiec calls "legal compliance officials, 68 are employed by companies to
fill gaps and to find loopholes by overlaying case law with these regulatory
schemes. Their goal is to measure bottom-line corporate behavior and
predict
safe zones of operation outside the written standards of regulation
69
law.

Courts have viewed exercises in gap filling as generally effective
cooperative governance measures when corporations are able to show
initiative toward avoiding compliance infractions.7 ° In fact, new affirmative
defenses, against sexual harassment for example, were arguably created by
the courts to reward private compliance initiatives.71 Consider, however, the
retrospect involved in lawmaking when courts reinforce private compliance
programs that reshape or custom-fit regulatory policy to meet corporate
interests. Essentially, custom-fitting law is the result of extralegal processes
between corporations and policy-makers, using "middlemen, 7 who jointly
adjust interpretations of regulatory policy, and modify or amend private
compliance initiatives accordingly.73 The result is a practice in "regulation
bilateralism," where corporations themselves create the law they follow to
diminish the legal risk they potentially experience.74

The problem with custom-fitting compliance is that "[flair-looking
procedures are often inaccurately conflated with non-discriminatory working
conditions. 75 In other words, procedural compliance is increasingly
associated with behavioral compliance. For example, Frank Dobbin and
Erin Kelly have published research on the spread of harassment procedures
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

See id. at 528.
Seeid at517.
Id. at 537.
See id at 534-35.
See id. at 536-37.
Seeid at536-40.
Id. at 528.
Id. at 532.
Id. at 533.
Michelle A. Travis et. al., Dispute Resolution in Action: Examining the Reality of

Employment Discrimination Cases, 11 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 139, 146 (2007); see Susan

Bisom-Rapp et al., A Critical Look at Organizational Responses to and Remedies for Sex
Discrimination, in SEX DISCRIMINATION IN THE WORKPLACE: MULTIDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES

273, 274-78 (2007); see also Frank Dobbin & Erin Kelly, How to Stop Harassment: Professional
Constructionof Legal Compliance in Organizations, 112 AM. J. SOC. 1203 (2007).
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in private companies.76 Their research "establishes that... ADR was
conceptualized [in corporations] and promoted by personnel professionals as
a bureaucratic solution to manage risk in the face of legal uncertainty. 77
Dobbins and Kelly conclude that corporate grievance "programs were billed
more as shields
from litigation than devices to reduce workplace
78
harassment.,
In efforts to shield liability, corporations have prioritized avoiding law
suits ahead of substantive efforts to assure appropriate behavior management
in the workplace. The judicial system itself has aided in corporate
reprioritization as courts have increasingly refocused on what I call
corporate "procedural compliance indicators," such as codes of conduct or
procedural guidelines, to determine legal liability.
One concern is that growing judicial reliance on procedural compliance
intensifies corporate management of compliance indicators, while not
necessarily reducing the incidence of substantive noncompliance. One study
in particular illustrates this finding: Lauren Edelman and others studied 116
court cases involving the use of what I call a "compliance defense" (called
grievance procedure defenses in this case).7 9

In approximately ninety

percent of the cases analyzed, courts were prepared to shield employers from
liability on the showing of a robust grievance procedure.8 °
3. Trend 3: Privatization of Employment Law Invites Independent
Oversight
The

private

sector

is

"'privatiz[ing]' ...

public

law"'"

by

institutionalizing a system of private enforcement practices, managed by a
contingency of compliance officials. These professionals are responsible for
compliance management or "strategic defense planning," and are personnel
often shared among major corporations.82 Legal compliance officers who
broker their services to growing lists of corporations soon dominate
approaches to best practice within and across corporate lines. The
76. Dobbin & Kelly, supranote 75.
77. Travis et al., supra note 75, at 145 (citing Dobbin & Kelly, supra note 75, at 1205).
78. Id. at 145; see Dobbin & Kelly, supra note 75, at 1237.
79. Lauren B. Edleman etal., The Endogeneity of Legal Regulation: GrievanceProcedures as
Rational Myth, 105 AM. J. SOC. 406, 431 (1999); see Krawiec, supranote 61, at 540.
80. See Edleman et al., supranote 79, at 425-26; see Krawiec, supranote 61, at 540.
81. See Kohler, supra note 5, at 122.
82. See Kraweic, supra note 61, at 534.
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collaborative use of extralegal actors throughout the legal hierarchy of selfregulating companies creates a high likelihood that many officials will
become "repeat players''83 in the corporate system. Essentially, these
conglomerates of exclusive players create a system where they are private
program designers of employment law.84 The approach is so successful that
ninety percent of Fortune 500 companies have program designs or legal
compliance structures in place.85
Compliance specialists are able to create the reality of compliance in
two primary ways: (1) by producing favorable evidence against employee87
grievances,6 and (2) by using performance reviews as preventive tools.
Both strategies are generally used strategically even before workplace
Further, "sanitizing ' 89 personnel files of
violations are reported.88
"misleading or harmful documents" 90 is often part of regular procedure for
maintaining evidence of non-discriminatory decision-making. 91 Compliance
specialists, together with human resource managers, often implement regular
preventive maintenance of employment files to improve the company's
defenses against employee claims.92 Additionally, a "standard performance
review system ' 93 that "point[s] out the employee's shortcomings, 94 is the
"preferred method for generating favorable documentation" 95 against
employee claims. This often includes documentation of employee discipline
of misconduct or
to assure that "date, time, locations, and witnesses
96
examples of poor performance [are] preserved.
Apart from the strategic defense planning of corporate legal compliance
officials, other players have been incorporated into a widening array of
extralegal actors in the employment law arena. These players enter the
private sector to eventually become arbitrators via mandatory arbitration
83.
84.
85.
86.

Lobel, supranote 3, at 954.
See Krawiec, supranote 61, at 522-23.
Id.at511.
Susan Bisom-Rapp, Discerning Form from Substance: Understanding Employer Litigation

Prevention Strategies, 3 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 1,16-17 (1991).

87.
88.

Id. at 19.
See id at 16-20.

89. Id. at 19 (quoting GERALD S. HARTMAN ET AL., CURRENT EMPLOYMENT LAW AND
RELATED LITIGATION ISSUES 358 (1994)).

90. Id.
91. Seeid at 18-19.
92. See id at 14-15.
93. Id.at 19.
94. Id.at 20 (quoting Ralph H. Baxter & Thomas P. Klein, Protecting Against Exposure,
NAT'L L.J. Feb. 28, 1994, at S1).
95. Id.at 19.
96. Id.at 26-27.
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clauses used in boundaryless employment contracts.97 A notable concern in
the arbitration field is the potential for repeat player arbitrators to be seen as
compliance officials in a larger network of privatized decision-making. 98
The corporate use of arbitration has not gone unnoticed by the judicial
system, but has instead become a practice increasingly supported by the
court system itself. A commonly referenced source is a 1994 draft report by
the Judicial Conference Committee on Long Range Planning recommending
that Congress eliminate federal jurisdiction over workplace disputes
"involving economic or personnel relations" 99 or personal liability claims.100
Eliminations based on the planning recommendations would encompass
most federal employment claims, if implemented. 1 Suggestions like these
demonstrate the reluctance of courts to second-guess employer's decisionmaking. 10 2 Judges have generally refused to substitute their judgments for
that of employers 0 3 in large part due to the notion that courts should not
function as legal "super-personnel departments. ' °4
The Supreme Court's broad ratification of mandatory arbitration for
employment disputes is further evidence of judicial efforts to expel
employment claims from court dockets. Essentially, mandatory arbitration
of statutory discrimination claims, sanctioned by Circuit City Stores, Inc. v.
Adams, 05 opened the door for private re-norming of employment law. As a
result, pre-employment arbitration clauses are now common practice and
progressively more successful in crafting virtually unfettered private
adjudication controls on employment grievance processes.
In short, self-regulation's private lawmaking system, added to the
negotiated governance of regulation law, equals virtually independent
oversight. In the case of self-regulation, legal norms are transformed into
company policy, protected by strategic evidence-gathering, all of which is
potentially defended through private arbitration. Principally, the process has

97. See Lauren B. Edelman, When the "Haves" Hold Court: Speculations on the
OrganizationalInternalizationof Law, 33 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 941, 941 (1999).
98. See id.
99. COMMITEE ON LONG RANGE PLANNING, JUD. CONF. OF THE U.S., 103d/104TH CONG.,
PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FED. CTS. 34-35 (1995).

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id.
Id.
See Bisom-Rapp, supra note 86, at 45.
See id.
Id.
532 U.S. 105 (2001).
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eliminated any effect of legal precedent apart from the repeat player culture
and potentially gives no right of appeal for claimants. As it stands, greatest
hope for jury trials of employment claims arguably lies in the motivation of
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) to bring
independent charges against companies themselves, 106 but currently, 10it7
makes up less than one percent of all cases the EEOC undertakes a year.
"Over the past decade, for example, the EEOC filed an average of 335
10 8 suits
on the merits per year out of an average of 81,000 charges received."
4.

Trend 4: Workplace Democracy Evolves into Deliberative
Autocratization

It has been suggested that during the latter part of the twentieth century,
the United States enjoyed the "greatest sustained economic growth in
history."10 9 In the context of that economic boom, "union density in the
private sector declined from almost 17% in 1983 to less than 10% in
2000.... [I]n the same period, workers' real wages declined more than 10
percent"'1 0 even though employees are working more hours now than they
did twenty years ago.1 1' These employment trends are directly tied to goals
of fair wage, which essentially replaced traditional competitive wage
practices.11 2 In other words, salaries are no longer measured by corporate
earnings (profit), but by the global market value of labor services. 1 3 This
means that if workers in Taiwan can make a product at the lowest cost, then
the manufacture of the same product in America is tied to the market value
of labor in Taiwan. This means that not only are American products no
longer profitable, but American labor has become costly as well.
Conversely, CEO salaries are not tied to the market value of anything.
Rather, CEO salaries are tied to corporate earnings margins.1 14 When
considered, the disparity between actual labor costs and corporate profit
margins is phantasmal. In large part because of this disparity, "CEOs of

106. See Occhialino & Vail, supra note 6, at 699.
107. See id. at 700.
108. Id.
109. Charles B. Craver, The American Worker: JuniorPartner in Success and Senior Partner
in Failure,37 U.S.F. L. REV. 587, 587 (2003).
110. Stone, supra note 13, at 787.
111. Mitchell, supra note 24, at 936 (citing Chasing the Dream, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 9,
2003, at 62; see also Juliet Schor, Why Americans Should Rest, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2002, at A 15).
112. See Michael Wachter, Labor Unions: A CorporatistInstitution in a Competitive World,
155 U. PA. L. REv. 581, 622 (2007).
113. See Stone, supra note 13, at 784.
114. See Craver, supranote 109, at 587-88.
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large firms who earned about forty times the annual salaries of regular
workers twenty-five years ago now earn about 475 times average employee
salaries., 115
To put these numbers into perspective, "as of 1998, the top 1% of
Americans held 38.5% of our national wealth, and the top 20% held
83.9%... leaving the remaining 80% of American families to split up the
balance (the bottom 60% of Americans hold virtually no wealth to speak
of)." 6 More specifically, "since 1980, the share of aggregate income
received by families in the top 5% has increased from 15.8% to 22.4%,
while the share of the bottom 5% has decreased from 4.3% to 3.5%."117 In
other words, the rich are getting richer and the poor are getting poorer.11 8
In short, while private sector employees have actually lost income while
working harder, "managers have shared directly in the success of their
companies."1 19 Arguably, much of this success comes from the evolution of
a low-finance age of hierarchy into the current high-finance era of market
economics,120 and more directly, from duties intrinsic in the fiduciary
relationship between corporate managers and company shareholders.1"1
Shareholder investment builds the wealth of a corporation, and threats of
divestiture or breach of fiduciary duty invoke great managerial energy
toward maximizing profits. Given the legal nature of these financial
relationships, employers often choose to "become collective through
corporate immortality, limited liability, and tax benefits," 122 amassing the
protections of corporate law. Employees, however, are not party to the
collective protection of corporate law or even corporate governance. 123 For
example, a Delaware Supreme Court upheld shareholders' rights to thwart
corporate decisions to protect the interests of a company's workforce.124 In
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., the court held that a takeover bid to
improve the interests of its employees was not in keeping with the board's

115.

Id.

116.

Mitchell, supra note 24, at 935-36.

117.
118.
119.

Id. at 935.
Seeid.at 935-36.
Craver, supra note 109, at 588.

120.
121.

Mitchell, supra note 24, at 936.
Wachter, supranote 112, at 622.

122.
123.
124.

Dannin, supra note 5, at 260.
See id.
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 958-59 (Del. 1985).
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duty to serve the primary interests of the shareholders.1 25 The court
determined that "it was for the shareholders that the corporation was to be
managed. 12 6 Implicit in the court's decision is the maxim
12 7 that management
simply does not owe a duty of service to its employees.
To that end, highly outcome-oriented corporations have positioned
themselves to mount the most effective business offensive ever for capturing
the most gain with the least cost. Recent results are reflected in the
following:
When corporations have experienced economic setbacks, employees have been the first
to be cut.., managers have reacted to poor profit reports with quick layoff
announcements designed to reduce costs, bolster public confidence, and boost stock
prices ....When [layoffsJ were announced, share par value often rose along with CEO
compensation packages.

Effectively, economics dictates an employee's success in the new
corporate environment ,because• her
' 12Fproductivity is inextricably intertwined
with the corporation's bottom-line.
Every employee as a financial asset is
labored to walk that line. "The goal, of course, is to create the largest
possible gap between the yield of this asset and the terms of its hire."' 13
Essentially, this means that every function of today's private sector
workforce is motivated by an economic end, clearly demonstrating the
severe disjunction between working hard and achieving success in the new
workplace.
One point in fact is that today's employee affiliations are textured
differently from upper echelon relationships between CEOs and
shareholders. For employees, it means that workplace relationships are
weakened'
by new expectations of impermanence and "quick
adjustment ' as companies flex into global markets. Being in competition
with employment markets around the world, employees are measured now
more than ever by their success on a global scale. A competition they are
losing.
In Part III, the case is made that an employee's achievement is, in fact,
estranged from her labor in today's boundaryless workplace. Much of the

125.

Wachter, supra note 112, at 621 (quoting Unocal Corp., 493 A.2d at 955).

126.

Id.

127. See Unocal Corp., 493 A.2d at 958-59.
128. Craver, supranote 109, at 588.
129. Berger, supra note 12, at 490.
130. JAMEs B. ATLESON, VALUEs AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW 14 (1983).
131. Katherine V. W. Stone, ProceduralJustice in the Boundaryless Workplace: The Tension
Between Due Process and Public Policy, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 501, 504 (2005).
132. Id.
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alienation is caused by a systemic deception in the way new private sector
employers label and market democratic practices and protections in the new
Arguably, private sector practices designed to improve
workplace.
employee voice and recognition are little more than smoke screens for public
In reality, analyzing the private workplace for
consumption.
democratization reveals a distorted and perhaps perverse perception of the
private employment experience.
III.

ANALYZING SELF-REGULATION FOR EVIDENCE OF WORKPLACE

DEMOCRATIZATION

Ready association between industrial democracy and the new workplace
gives rise to questions of comparison between genuinely cooperative work
Does the new
environments and new boundaryless environments.
workplace really offer employees the right "to influence decisions affecting
Is the evolution of the workplace its
their working lives? ' 1 33
democratization? Are we even approaching a more democratic workplace?
What are we measuring that makes us think so?
In order to answer these questions one must understand the nature of
current research on the American workplace experience. Recent scholarship4
has answered some of these questions mostly in the affirmative.1
Unfortunately, it has done so by framing the private employment experience
through a narrow lens. Scholars have tended to address the new workplace
through the lens of corporate America, not through the lens of working
America. 35 However, when the lens is opened to analyze the experiences of
the American workforce, differences in perspective between the two views
are staggering and beg correction.
By looking through the lens of American employees, research reveals
that democratic activity in the workplace is, in reality, little improved and
perhaps more greatly egregious to employees today than ever before. 36 The
133.
134.

Craver, supra note 109, at 596.
See Reuben, supra note 4, at 12-13; see, e.g., CYNTHIA ESTLUND, WORKING TOGETHER:

How WORKPLACE BONDS STRENGTHEN A DIVERSE SOCIETY (2003); Stone, supra note 2; PETER
CAPPELLI, THE NEW DEAL AT WORK: MANAGING THE MARKET-DRIVEN WORKFORCE (1999); Peter
F. Drucker, The New Society of Organizations, HARV. Bus. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1992, at 100; Tara J.

Radin & Patricia H. Werhane, The Public/Private Distinction and the Political Status of
Employment, 34 AM. BUS. L.J. 245, 259-60 (1996); CHRISTOPHER MCMAHON, AUTHORITY AND
DEMOCRACY: A GENERAL THEORY OF GOVERNMENT AND MANAGEMENT 17-27 (1994).

135.
136.

See generally id
Id.
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negative effects of self-regulation on workers illustrate growing incongruity
between company practices and employment rights, which have been
significantly altered by the mechanics of autonomous business policy.
Undeniably, autonomous frameworks for private enterprise have existed
as American business models since the country's inception. The birthing of
a sovereign nation saw economic freedom and opportunity as indelible
protections. In conjunction, the practice of collective bargaining itself
developed from workers' desire "to engage in mutual aid and protection[]
and to have an active part in improving and stabilizing their working
conditions.' ' 137 In other words, American employees have always valued
free enterprise, conditioned on essentials of mutuality in their working
relationships and the self-determination needed to function as experts in
their field. 138 These assurances have historically provided relative job
security through promotions, pay raises, and retirement plans.
Comparing collectivist ideals to the new boundaryless workplace,
however, illustrates a dramatic dissimilarity between cooperative business
values and the new workplace ethos. Certainly, the private sector
workforce, corporations notwithstanding, is represented by a spectrum of
workplace environments using differing degrees of democratic practice and
self-regulating schemes. Indeed, "individual workplaces and industries vary
greatly with respect to such progressiveness., 139 The problem lies in
growing alienation in the employment goals of employee and her employer,
manifested in the disharmony between conventional-minded workers and
new boundaryless employment values. 140 Few companies have successfully
tethered traditional employment goals with new workplace values. The
Saturn Corporation is one among those that tried.
The ability of self-regulating corporations to maintain cooperative
workplace values was best tested in the General Motors - U.A.W. Saturn
Corporation "experiment.' 141 In fact, Saturn is frequently highlighted in
academic literature as a model for cooperative business enterprise. The
Saturn Corporation has been described as one of the most employeecentered corporations in America due to their extensive network of shop
committees, or employment involvement programs (EIPs), a trait not many
137. Dannin, supra note 5,at 262.
138. See Marion Crain, The Transformation of the Professional Workforce, 79 CHI.-KENT. L.
REV. 543, 545 (2004) ("Historically, the professions avoided commodification by exchanging the
collective commodity for their expertise for autonomy at work and monopoly power over their
craft.").
139. Reuben, supra note 4, at 13 (quoting CYNTHIA ESTLUND, WORKING TOGETHER: How
WORKPLACE BONDS STRENGTHEN A DIVERSE SOCIETY 56-59 (2003)).

140. See Reuben, supra note 4, at 14.
141. Craver, supra note 109, at 605.
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Effectively, Saturn "emulate[d] their foreign
other companies share.
competitors and created shop level committees designed to minimize
enhance product of service quality, and improve
employee dissatisfaction,
142
productivity."'
Saturn's use of shop committees is one corollary to true cooperative
work. Other companies have integrated EIP, as well. Research shows that
"64% of firms have established at least minimal employee involvement
Further, "86% of the Fortune 1000 companies have
programs ....
created involvement committees. '144 These numbers appear to indicate a
trend toward some degree of employee self-determination in the workplace.
However, these numbers are misleading.
One must measure the growing numbers of EIPs against the single most
important corporate goal of employee participation, the eradication of the
risk of unionization. 45 "[A]ccording to studies.., employee participation
programs are among the most effective anti-union strategies implemented by
In contrast to the union structure, private sector
employers. 146
"participation schemes are depicted as creating a more flexible, informal,
and collaborative framework" 147 for negotiating better work environments.
If this is the case, then corporations offering highly controlled employee
input programs are successfully avoiding much greater employment
autonomy offered by unionized activity.
Essentially, EIPs are an example of the new flexibility of nonunion
enterprise, but also of new mechanisms for corporate control. What EIPs are
not doing is safeguarding workers when flexible plans fail to protect their
interests, leaving them with little recourse. This loophole exists in part
because of the fine line definition of § 8 of the National Labor Relations Act
(forbidding employer management of labor organizing), which restricts
employee involvement initiatives. 48 Ultimately, these restrictions offer
out of substantive grievance procedures and
boundaryless companies
149 a way
benefits negotiations.

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id.
Id.

148.

Craver, supra note 109, at 605.

149.

See id

Id.
Lobel, supra note 26, at 143.
Id.
Id. at 142-43.
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Platitudes describing Saturn's success are far reaching. Yet, a closer
investigation shows that even Saturn falls short of a true cooperative
workplace paradigm in important ways. While shop committees convene
around improving productivity, they have not had the power to resolve
worker grievancesl 5° or negotiate over existing employment conditions. 5'
Likewise, "[m]anagers decide the structure of these [improvement] plans
and the issues to be addressed, and they generally
reserve the right to
152
determine which committee proposals to accept."'
As described, Saturn's approach is a corporate experiment. The
company has struggled with "limited profitability"' 53 issues. Theorists are
not certain how long Saturn will be able to maintain its profit redistribution
system before having to reorganize. 154 The company has struggled with the
reality of limited profitability as a result of shared economic rewards with
employees, and is currently on GM's chopping block because of industry
downturn. Therefore, Saturn's best case scenario provides only guarded
satisfaction that new workplaces are experiencing sustainable democratic
behaviors in the self-regulating environment.
A.

ComparingCooperative Enterpriseto the Self-Regulating Workplace

An array of democratic terms and descriptors has been used by
companies to market human resource innovations in the boundaryless
workplace, Saturn's shop committees notwithstanding. Most of these labels
are meant either to reinterpret employee relationships on the management
ladder, or to redelegate employee control over the office work environment.
Thus, buzzwords like "facilitative management," "flat hierarchies,"
"horizontal management teams," "self-directed teams," "cross-functional
work teams," "micro-level job control," "co-determination," "participatory
employment," and "dynamic problem-solving," all signify a close
15
association of employment practices with authentic workplace democracy,
as have been borrowed from the American cooperative business paradigm.
These terms, or principles, are time-honored labels for cooperative
workplace initiatives, and are highly value laden. Further, particular values
historically shared by most business cooperative alliances are also those

150.
151.

See id.at 605-06.
See id.

152. Id.at 606.
153. See Orly Lobel, Note, OrchestratedExperimentalism in the Regulation of Work, 101
MICH. L. REv. 2146, 2151 (2003) (quoting PAUL OSTERMAN ET AL., WORKING IN AMERICA: A

BLUEPRINT FOR THE NEW LABOR MARKET 86 (2001)).
154. Id.
155. Seeid.at2150.
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which unions have historically bargained for: member control and
participation in workplace decision-making, autonomous self-help
organizing, and community cooperation and support. 15 6 In other words,
when cooperative workplace labels so closely aligned with traditional
workplace democracy and union values are used to define the status of
employees within current self-regulating corporations, those labels attach
name recognition to rich histories of employee participation and control over
highly democratic employment sectors. Therefore, the corporate adoption of
poignant buzzwords, such as those listed above, creates the illusion that selfdirected, co-determined, and cross-functional private sector employees are,
in fact, highly involved in primary processes of daily business management.
Is that really true for most private sector employees today or have they been
marginalized instead?
1. Corporate Structures: The Allure of Work Teams and Flattened
Hierarchies
Cooperative enterprises are generally described as "cooperatively owned
"Worker cooperatives
and democratically managed workplace[s]."'
embrace egalitarian ideologies and utilize flattened workplace hierarchies
with few levels of formal supervision."' 5 8 They "use democratic processes
to create their grievance procedures and to hire their managers."'' 59 Research
notes that participating in workplace cooperatives engenders team
These skills-building
organization and self-management skills. 16 1
mechanisms within organized work teams tend to increase selfconfidence.' 6 1 Subsequently, the phenomenon of "group mode"' 62 grows out
63
of teamwork practices, and the perception of "fair treatment" increases.
Group mode specifically creates a work environment in which workers
"embrace behavior patterns based on fairness, rather than on expected
These positive behavior patterns
outcomes (distributive justice)."' 64

156.
157.

See generally id.
Hoffman, supra note 9, at 51.

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Id.
Id. at 55.
Id. at 53.
Id.
Id.at 55.
Id. at 54.
Id.
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constitute what can be called "workforce continuity" 165 via teamwork
efforts. As a result, "teams are probably the most difficult work innovation
to implement 'and
the one that is most likely to be disrupted by turnover and
166
restructuring."

Boundaryless workplace reform boasts improved teamwork efforts. It is
a system that involves accolades such as re-skilling and enhanced
networking, but not employment security. 167 In other words, today's
employment system is replete with high turnover and restructuring. "'Jobs'
are being replaced by 'projects' and 'fields of work' . . . giving rise to a
society that is increasingly 'jobless but not workless."" 168 What Katherine
Stone has termed "transitory employment" 169 and I describe as "working
transience" is the phenomenon of systemically induced high employee
turnover rate inherent in new private sector employment.'
Working
transience is central to the new workplace paradigm. This phenomenon
tends to naturally limit the success of teamwork structures, as employees
move in and out of short-term, fast-paced work activities, and on to new
similarly situated positions in other companies171 The nature of such
17 2
continual change diminishes the lasting effects of teamwork efforts.
"Teams thus rely upon173the very factor that the new workplace repudiatesworkforce continuity."'

Apart from mischaracterized rhetoric about teamwork, the new
workplace also redefines traditional functions of "flattened hierarchies. 174
Originally, flattened hierarchies, or what I call "cooperative hierarchies,"
operated with high levels of autonomy With industry employeesparticipating
in management functions as experts in their production tasks.1 5 They still
operate that way. Cooperative hierarchies employ highly decentralized and
flexible personnel networks. Today, however, the boundaryless workplace

165.
166.

Stone, supra note 13, at 793.
Id. at 792 (quoting Paul Osterman, Work Reorganization in an Era of Restructuring:

Trends in Diffusion and Effects on Employee Welfare, 53 INDus. & LAB. REL. REv. 179, 186

(2000)).
167. Id. at 793.
168. Catherine L. Fisk, Knowledge Work: New Metaphorsfor the New Economy, 80 CHI-KENT
L. REV. 839, 840 (2005) (quoting Edmund L. Andrews, Don't Go Away Mad, Just Go Away: Can
AT&TBe the Nice Guy as It Cuts 40,000 Jobs?, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 13, 1996, at Dl, D6).

169.
170.

Stone, supranote 13 1, at 503.
Id.

171.
172.

Stone, supra note 13, at 792.
Id.

173.

Id. at 793 (emphasis added).

174.
175.

Id. at 783.
See id.
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has redefined the flattened hierarchy
model, which is not cooperative at all,
176
but consolidated and centralized.
In her analysis of employment metaphors, Catherine Fisk provides a
keen example of the difference between traditional cooperative hierarchies
and new boundaryless hierarchies, using a case involving the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB), Harrah's Lake Tahoe Resort Casino.177 In this
case, an employee proposed to change the company's employee stock
ownership plan to increase total employee ownership from one percent to
fifty percent. 78 The employee distributed a leaflet to his colleagues
describing how a leveraged buyout would increase job stability, pay, morale,
and retirement benefits through a new process of participatory
management. 179 On review, the NLRB determined the employee's actions
were not protected behavior because his proposal sought to advance
workers' interests not as employees but as entrepreneurs, owners, and
managers, which they were not. 80 The Board determined that only Harrah's
corporate management could make such a change. 181 In the company's rapid
efforts toward nationwide expansion, 182 and consequential corporate reengineering, Harrah's management readily declined the idea of a leveraged
buyout.
2.

Management Techniques: A Focus on Corporate Re-engineering

In 2005, Diane Avery and Marion Crain investigated Harrah's employee
management methods, as it was the "largest gaming corporation in the
world[],' 83 to discover a systematic devaluation of employees under the
guise of the company's corporate re-engineering process. 8 4 With the
termination of middle management and new centralized control over human
resources, Harrah's workforce can be described as a novel model of

176. See generally Dianne Avery & Marion Crain, Branded- Corporate Image, Sexual
Stereotyping, and the New Faceof Capitalism, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 13, 69-70 (2007).
177. Harrah's Lake Tahoe Resort Casino, 307 NLRB 182 (1992); Fisk, supra note 168, at 845.
178. Fisk, supra note 168, at 845; 307 NLRB at 182.
179. Fisk, supra note 168, at 845.
180. Id. at 845-46.
181.

Id.

182.
183.
184.

See Avery & Crain, supra note 176, at 69.
Id.
See id.
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flattened hierarchy. 85 Yet, its labor model entails the scientific management
of employment skills, a concept born under the labor management scheme of
mid-twentieth century Taylorism. 186 "Scientific management refers to the
systematic process of dividing jobs up into discrete components so as to
centralize control over the knowledge of the labor process in management
and increase profits."'' 87 Further, "scientific management techniques
typically involve an in-depth study of the craft and subsequent reduction of
its principles or knowledge base to a series of rules, which can be delegated
to less skilled or specialized workers in the interest of efficiency and profit
maximization. ,1 88 Scientific management was re-engineered in the 1980s
under the Japanese influence of the "lean production" system. 89 Under reengineering, managerial functions are consolidated, redundant positions are
eliminated,1 90 and the control of job skills is transferred from workers to
management. 191

Central to any method of scientific management is the goal of "deskilling" the workforce. 192 De-skilling is essentially the drastic reduction of
independent employee decision-making and the compartmentalizing of
technical activities. 93 Time is money, and thinking takes time, hence
thinking costs money. 94 Therefore, de-skilling diminishes the creative
thinking and problem-solving an employee is required to do.19 5 Reengineering employee approaches to productivity by training them in routine
practices and the use of input devices for technological problem-solving,
saves time and thus money.1 96 The boundaryless workplace essentially reengineers this paradigm into a broader psychological approach.
Boundaryless workplace practices are supposed to have replaced
Taylorism, or scientific management, as the "new organizational behavior
theories and practices aim[ing] to inculcate knowledge and skill in the

185. See id. at 69-70.
186. See Crain, supra note 138, at 555-56; see also Michael C. Harper, The Continuing
Relevance of Section 8(a)(2) to the Contemporary Workplace, 96 MICH. L. REv. 2322, 2358 (1998)
("Taylor developed a 'scientific' theory for how management could best control workers engaged in
standardized work.").
187. Crain, supra note 138, at 555.
188. Id. at 556.
189. See Harper, supranote 186, at 2357.
190. Stone, supranote 2, at 568.
191. Harper, supranote 186, at 2364.
192. See generally id.; see Avery & Cain, supra note 176, at 76-77.
193. See generally id
194. See Avery & Cain, supra note 176, at 77.
195. See id.
196. See id.
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worker at every level. 197 According to Katherine Stone, companies "have
abandoned Taylorism, dismantled their internal labor market modes of
organization, and instead have attempted to substitute more flexible forms of
work."'1 98 In reality, what defines the boundaryless workplace today is the
pairing of residual scientific management goals with new broadly skilled
horizontal hierarchies through new techniques such as "up-skilling" or
"cross-training. ' 99
Up-skilling is the boundaryless term for retraining or broadening
workers' productivity for improved work product or services. 200 Up-skilling,
in boundaryless terms, is the psychological equivalent of de-skilling in
scientific management in that both "assume[] that people are largely
interchangeable, 20 ' and ultimately replaceable.
A good example of
boundaryless re-engineering is the new automated checkout stations used in
many grocery stores.20 2 These "fast lanes" have replaced cashiers with
computers, and rely on customer self-help for workplace checkout routines.
The cashier stands at a remote counter and watches the flow of employeeless interactions for the entirety of her work shift, ready to manage a broader
range of problems that may arise in the automated checkout lines, but often
does little with her expertise. In this light, the manner in which corporations
market democratic processes like work team efforts and flattened hierarchies
to today's highly interchangeable workforce is difficult to appreciate. If, at
this point, it is still hard to conceptualize the level of micro-control
American employees really suffer on the job, then ask yourself the next time
you drive-thru for a happy meal how happy you are that the burger you
ordered was actually made your way.
3.

Human Resource Policies: The Potential for Commodified
Employment

Marion
Crain
describes corporate
re-skilling
practices
as
"commodification" or the "objectification of human beings and their
labor,, 20 3 and equates slavery to the ultimate commodification of human

197.

Stone, supra note 2, at 523.

198. Id. at 523.
199.

Harper, supra note 186, at 2364.

200.
201.
202.

See id. at 2364.
Avery & Crain, supra note 176, at 25 (citation omitted).
Crain, supra note 138, at 563.

203.

Id. at 543.
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labor. 2° Crain states that "professional" employees have historically been
able to avoid commodification by "exchanging the collective commodity of
their expertise for autonomy at work and monopoly power over their
craft., 205 However, today, flattened hierarchies with invisible power
dynamics 20 6 and professional subordination to centralized control20 have
discarded the idea of autonomous experts. Instead, boundaryless hierarchies
have promoted up-skilling as the new and improved workplace management
where secretly,
"workers [become] fungible and high turnover [is] no longer
20 8
costly.

Catherine Fisk depicts Wal-Mart as a metaphor for this new
workplace. 20 9 Her example illustrates the fungible nature of today's
employees.
Wal-Mart in Bakersfield, California, tries to be perceived as a humane employer. They
do not provide any benefits-no health care, no pensions, no childcare, no disability
insurance, nothing. And they do not pay enough for many employees to afford those
things, themselves. But they are not heartless. They give each employee a list of the free
social services that are available in the city and county.210

Fisk concludes, "It is our acceptance of the legally fictive entity-the
corporation-as defining the scope of legal and social duties to the workers
who serve it that enables corporations that use and benefit from labor to
avoid most legal consequences for exploiting it."'21'
Essentially, in
cooperative business environments, the employment system exploits
problem-solving, teamwork, autonomy, and expertise for profit.21 2 In the
contingent environment of the boundaryless workplace, however, the system
exploits employees for profit.
The boundaryless workforce is one in which, "work has.., become
contingent, not merely in the sense that it is formally defined as short-term
or episodic, but also in the sense that the attachment between the firm and
the worker has been weakened., 21 3 Contingent employment includes
growing numbers of part-time workers, temporary personnel, outsourced
experts, and independent contractors.2 4
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

Id.
Id. at 545.
See Stone, supranote 2, at 606-07.
Crain, supranote 138, at 545.
Avery & Crain, supra note 176, at 21-22.

209. See Fisk, supra note 168, at 869-70.
210. Id. at 869.
211. Id.at845.

212. Id.
213.
214.

Stone, supra note 13, at 776.
Fisk, supra note 168, at 490.
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Workforce continuity is fragile in this new environment because
employees are often seen as self-managed free agents 215 hired for "abilities
and potentials rather than work history. '21 6 Practices such as up-skilling and
networking orient boundaryless employees to "person descriptions rather
than job descriptions," 217 through which businesses manage people, not
expertise. In other words, organizations now "base human resource policy
not on the job but on the individual. 2 8 Job qualifications are thus focused
less on documented experience and more on image and interpersonal
skills-the "soft skills."'2 9 Employment, therefore, is less organized by
expertise than by psychological orientations to productivity. 220 As a result
employees identify with their employment roles through workplace
indoctrination, often called the "new psychological contract. '22I However,
what scholars tend to label as a contract is much more like a methodical,
psychological conditioning.
4.

Employment Contracts: Exercises in Pre-conditioning

As described, the new psychological contract is a psychological
orientation toward work product and productivity.222 In order to maximize
both, the new psychological contract seeks employees who match a
corporate image, are adaptable, compliant, and expendable. Boundaryless
employers orient newly hired employees toward performance expectations
through controlled psychological conditioning. Psychological conditioning
generally begins upon hire so to establish employment expectations from the
start. Companies often provide extensive job orientation and training
223
activities using methods like the "transformation" employment approach
in order to regiment employee work activities in a comprehensive way.
The "transformation" . . approach, confers control over the work process by
transforming the worker into one whose personal characteristics, appearance, and values

215. Stone, supra note 13, at 774 (paraphrasing BRUCE TULGAN, WINNING THE TALENT WARS
155-57 (2001)).
216. Id. at 774.
217. Stone, supra note 2, at 562.
218. Id.
219. Lobel, supranote 26, at 166-67.
220. See id.
221. Stone, supra note 2, at 549-50.
222. Lobel, supra note 26, at 166-67.
223. Avery & Crain, supra note 176, at 20.
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match the image that the company is seeking to project and market, and then allowing the
worker to make his or her own judgments in interactions with customers. Such "selfregulation" techiues seek to create workers who act like managers without sharing...
managerial pay.

Psychological effects of the transformation approach can reach far into
the egos of predisposed employees by "engag[ing] workers in a way that
their hunger for respect and voice is diminished., 225 Scholars suggest that
employees who value their corporate image feel the power of that image
without necessarily having any real positional authority. 226 As a result, the
cost of middle management is diminished, productivity is increased, and the
interest in union activity is reduced.227 In short, employees are generally
type-cast into employment positions where they intemalize the corporate
image, embrace new boundaryless values, and offer brand marketing in lieu
of industry, innovation, or service.228 In the process, the world of innovative
ideas increasingly originates from outside a corporation, 229 and therefore,
ingenuity is outsourced rather than intemalized.
Authors Dianne Avery and Marion Crain reflect on the fantastical
example of Disneyland 230 as a re-emerging business model for boundaryless
enterprise with "type-casting" or branded service at its core. Walt Disney
was a businessman truly ahead of his time. He created a legendary theme
park based on the idea that employees were type-caste into their employment
roles as Disney characters. According to the authors, scholars call this
Branding "orients the workers
imaging process "branding. ' , 231
psychologically toward the business's brand values and with regulations that
script worker self-presentation .... ,,232 Disney's dramatic approach was
revitalized in the 1980s to teach branded service as a management technique
at the Disney Institute.233 There, employees become the face of business as
fictional characters, in an almost fictional employment experience. 3
Employers leam "casting for the show,, 235 or how to choose and train
employees with the right attitude and appearance to function in an

224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. See id.
229. Fisk, supranote 168, at 847.
230. See Avery & Crain, supra note 176, at 26-27.
231. See id. at 17-18.
232. Id. at 22.
233. See id. at 26.
234. Id.
235. Id.
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environment where behavior is strictly regulated.236 In short, prospective
employees are tasked to be everything corporate, everything but who they
are if who they are cannot be capitalized on, and employers capitalize on
everything.
There exists an inevitable problem with this kind of work ethic. The
predicament is that "the employer's imposed norms of behavior, attitude,
and appearance ... can be self-alienating. 2 37 When the employment role or
script becomes unnatural or loses its appeal, employees and their employers
lose relational parity, which leads them to part ways. For example, Walt
Disney would never expect to employ a Cinderella character until her
retirement. Naturally, children would not understand why the Magical
Kingdom's most popular princess had begun to look strangely "grandmaesque" after awhile. In other words, today's Cinderella of "certain age" no
longer meets princess-like expectations and remains a princess no more.
In the same sense, boundaryless employees, like aging Cinderellas,
typically transition out of dead-end roles and into positions in new
companies for a fresh experience, unwittingly signing new psychological
contracts with different employers. Employees become working transients
in this process, moving in and out of positions in search of the rightjob, or a
good fit, and perhaps, infrequently finding it. The hunger to work at
something meaningful; to climb the ladder of success; to find the
camaraderie of office-family relationships; and to retire after loyal service
becomes intently conflictive with the realities of the modem workplace
environment.
Increasingly unfulfilled, employees begin to battle job
dissatisfaction and career uncertainty. As the case may be, a princess cannot
expect to be a princess forever. What's worse, there is no longer a logical
next step for a princess past her prime, no matter how experienced she is.
Cinderella is forced, instead, to move on, to reinvent herself as a different
character in a new storyline. Many transitioning employees find moving on
a difficult task, however. One study suggests that "[f]or every one percent
increase in unemployment, homicides rise 5.7%; suicides increase 4.1%;
deaths from heart disease, liver cirrhosis, and stress-related disorders
increase by 1.9%; and 4.3% more
men and 2.3% more women admit
238
themselves to mental hospitals.

236.
237.
238.
(2005).

Id.
Id. at 24.
Robert C. Bird, Employment as a Relational Contract, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 149, 162
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Essentially, aligning modem market driven goals with "valuesbranding" creates a potentially perverse psychological contract between
professional employer and her workforce, which is inherently unsustainable
on many levels. Not only that, but the new employment experience is
described as no less than militaristic in nature. In corporate terms, "the
organization[al] principle of bureaucracy is command., 23 9 Now more than
240
ever, companies want the freedom to "deploy their work forces quickly"
with the expectation that employees of the modem office will go above and
beyond the call of duty 241 with "firms disavow[ing] any long-term
employment relationship. 242 A morbid mind might fashion the image of
employees scrambling around the corporate landscape performing
"spontaneous and innovative activity '' 243 in duck-and-cover moves to avoid
human resource landmines on their careers. Why such behavior exists is
perfectly clear: today, "the risk of the firm's ... success is placed squarely

on the employee." 2 "

B. The Demise of Social Capital in the Workplace

Perhaps the most unfortunate part of the new psychological contract and
its various forms of values-branding is the reality that many employees have
bought into the objectification schemes of the modem workplace, and
ultimately, experience a greater sense of defeat than the lack of a promotion
or the loss of a job. 245 Today's employees experience the defeat of the
psyche itself. In other words, in today's boundaryless workplace, when an
employee loses an employment opportunity, faces termination, or
experiences irresolvable conflict, she loses herself as well as her job
security, by design.
Contrast aggressive images of the new psychological contract with the
observation that "the workplace is widely viewed as a training ground for
democratic participation., 246 Under this theory, the workplace functions as a
segment of civil society within which personnel "embrace notions of public

239. Orly Lobel, Agency and Coercion in Labor and Employment Relations: Four Dimensions
of Power in Shifting Patterns of Work, 4 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 121, 179 (2001) (emphasis
removed).
240. Stone, supranote 131, at 504.
241. See id. at 504-05.
242. Id. at 504.
243. Id. (citation omitted).
244. Id. at 505.
245. See Crain, supra note 135, at 545.
246. Ann C. Hodges, The Limits of Multiple Rights and Remedies: A Call for Revisiting the
Law of the Workplace, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 601, 620 (2005).
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trust, social connection, cooperation, reciprocity, and civic virtue., 247 In
combination, notions like these create social capital in the workplace or
shared values by which employees ground their work environments. Social
connectedness 248 grows through the use of shared values until over time they
evolve into social norms. The process takes time and requires broad
participation at all levels of society. By analysis, social capital in the
workplace should reach from the boardroom to the mailroom, and back
again.

Essentially, all parties must serve the efforts of shared workplace

values in order for social capital to emerge within the work environment.
is
One explanation for the mechanics of social capital in the workplace 249
centered in the idea of OCB or "organizational citizenship behavior.
OCB is often defined as the degree to which employees perform over and
above the requirements of their formal job descriptions.250 Workplaces with
high OCB tend to demonstrate a high degree of social connectedness and
share democratic norms which have evolved from positive social capital, or
values, in the workplace.2 11 Business cooperatives tend to function with
high OCBs.2 12 In a highly functional workplace, OCB translates into powersharing, either formally or informally, and often both.253

Power-sharing arguably marks the highest measure of success for
democratic practices in the workplace.254 On the other hand, where powersharing is not occurring-for example, where segments of employees have
no power base-then not only is democratic practice hindered, but also all
evidence points to the failed evolution of a social capital which is needed to
create social connectedness in the workplace. What may be true in many
cases is that employees are functioning with duck-and-cover strategies,
instead, as employer autocracies define which workplace values will be
exercised via the new psychological contract. Does it really seem likely that
today's employees would want to work longer and harder for their
247. Reuben, supra note 4, at 20 (citing ROBERT D. PUTNAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK:
CIVIC TRADITIONS IN MODERN ITALY, 163-87 (1993)).
248. See id. at 22.
249. See id.(citing DENNIS W. ORGAN, ORGANIZATIONAL CITIZENSHIP BEHAVIOR: THE GOOD
SOLDIER SYNDROME 4-5 (1988)).

250.
Affective
(1989)).
251.
252.
253.
254.

Stone, supra note 2, at 557 (citing Dennis W. Organ & Mary Konovsky, Cognitive Versus
Determinants of Organization Citizenship Behavior, 74 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 157, 157
See id.
See Hoffman, supra note 6, at 56.
See id.
Craver, supranote 104, at 594.
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employers for less pay and fewer benefits? Are employees really looking to
invest more effort for less job security? Why?
1. Opportunistic Behavior in Workplace Relations
In Robert Bird's examination of workplace relations he reveals that
"relational opportunism"' 255 or opportunistic behavior on the part of
employers diminishes employee morale. "Relational opportunism is selfinterest seeking that contradicts the terms of an established relational
[psychological] contract., 256 Bird used research performed by Pauline Kim
to interpret the phenomenon of relational opportunism in the workplace.257
He suggests that "taking advantage of
258employees' ignorance of the law is an
example of relational opportunism.,
"Contradicting the perception that employees understood employment at
will, [Pauline] Kim found that employees wrongly believed they have
significant job security. ' 259 Kim discovered that "eighty-two percent of

respondents incorrectly believed that an employer cannot replace an
2 60
employee with another employee to do the same job for less pay.,
Further, "eighty-nine percent of respondents incorrectly believed that an
employer cannot fire an employee because of personal dislike. 261 These
results "suggest a serious disconnect between the expectations of employees
and the realities of contemporary employment law." 262 They also suggest
that employees fail to comprehend the potential omniscience employers have
in negotiating today's employment terms and even employment
relationships themselves.
For most employees, a relational contract begins alongside any formal
employment contract and then evolves with norms of the workplace into an
informal understanding of employment rights, responsibilities, and
expectations. The formal employment agreement develops into an informal
relationship between employer and employee with emotional ties. In other
words, business is never just business, it is also personal. As Kim's study

255. Bird, supra note 235, at 198.
256. Id. at 198; see also Ian R. Macneil, Economic Analysis of Contractual Relations: Its
Shortfalls and the Need for a "Rich ClassificatoryApparatus," 75 Nw. U. L. REv. 1018, 1024 n.20
(1981).
257.

Bird, supra note 235, at 196.

258. Id.
259. Id. at 196; See Pauline T. Kim, Bargainingwith Imperfect Information:A Study of Worker
Perceptions of Legal Protection in an At-Will World, 83 CORNELL. L. REv. 105 (1997).
260. Id. (paraphrasing Kim, supra note 254, at 134).
261. Id. at 196-97 (paraphrasing Kim, supra note 254, at 134).
262. Befort, supra note 7, at 388.
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illustrates, many workers found it hard to believe they would be penalized or
even fired for reasons not attributableto formal contract terms. Indefinable
penalties arising out of personal preference and professional bias can be
caustic, implicitly redefining an employment relationship and changing its
nature for reasons that have nothing to do with performance of contract
terms. When an employer redefines relational terms with an employee, i.e.,
changes the nature of the employment relationship for unattributed reasons,
it inevitably causes a "relational attitude change," 263 diminishes any
emotional investment being made and further, potentially undermines an
employee's work ethic.
Employees unavoidably experience ethical dilemmas when an employer
breaches the shared psychological contract-the relational connectedness
between employer and employee. Ethical dilemmas exists because an
employee often infers contractual diligence from an employer's relational
behavior. Relational behavior is a valuable indicator of employment
assurances and when violated, it is the cause of conflict, the ruin of good
workplace relations, and importantly, the ruin of positive work ethic. One
study indicates that "psychological contract violations [lead] employees to
reevaluate and downgrade their view of their obligations to their
employers. ' 2 4 Not surprisingly, relational opportunism "is a primary cause
of employment resentment" 26 in the workplace.
Generally speaking, corporations are not necessarily seeking to
disgruntle employees into poor job performance though that is often the
result. In the words of Jack Welch, former CEO of General Electric, what
modem business enterprise is trying to do is focus "people's emotional
energy... outward on a competitive world where no business is a safe
haven for employment unless it is winning in the marketplace. 266 This
suggests that employees are engaged in market relations more than they are
in workplace relations, not unlike private speculators, but as "human capital
investors, 2 67 juggling the interests of their companies for the sake of their
professional futures.

263.
264.

See Bird, supra note 235, at 168.
Stone, supra note 2, at 550-51 (summarizing Sandra L. Robinson et al., Changing

Obligationsand the PsychologicalContract:A LongitudinalStudy, 37 ACAD. MGMT. J. 137, 149-50

(1994)).
265. Bird, supra note 235, at 199.
266. Stone, supra note 13, at 778 (emphasis added).
267. See Stone, supra note 2, at 558.
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Unfortunately, the creation of "market employees," with an outward
focus under the ploy of speculative employment terms, inevitably results in
opportunistic behavior, diminished workplace relations and ultimately
deflated work ethic. As work ethic ebbs, the speculation cycle produces
workplace conflict, and the beginning of the end of an employee's tenure. 68
This modem relational cycle is truly problematic because the outward focus
required of today's workers actually creates the cycle of diminished work
ethic, poor performance ratings, a surge in workplace dispute, and the
subsequent working transience that comes with termination, unemployment,
and the struggles of new job searches. Clearly, today's employment
experience lies in open contradiction to the historical view that in America
"[p]rofessionals' experience of work has been characterized by autonomy
and the privilege to self-regulate.

,,269

In retrospect, whatever pains unionized employment protections have
historically caused for private enterprise, arguably, nothing has been better
than the union contract at focusing workplace energies inward toward
productivity and quality rather than outward over the span of market
forces.270 "The most common explanation [for this] is that unions facilitate
the enforcement of long-term contracts by preventing employers from acting
opportunistically through the enactment of just-cause provisions, seniority
rules and other such clauses. 271 Today's private enterprise, however,
increasingly relies on purely relational terms to condition tenure, the result
of which is a potential tug-of-war between employer and employee over
rights to terms of employment.
Ellen Dannin offers a legal context for this discussion using the case J ./
Case Co. v. NLRB. 272 In this 1944 case, the Supreme Court noted that while
employment is contract-like, the contract exists within the context of a
working relationship.273 Further, the working relationship is layered with a
mix of status, custom, and informal understandings that are continually
reshaped.274 It is unclear, however, how much of the case's rhetoric would
be reaffirmed in today's Court.
Dannin explains that much of the conflict inherent in workplace
relationships is "rooted in the ...struggle over who owns a job, on what

268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.

See Bird, supra note 235, at 169.
Crain, supra note 135, at 544.
See Lobel, supra note 23, at 131.
Id.
J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944); Dannin, supranote 5, at 256.
Dannin, supra note 5, at 256.
Id. at 256.
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basis, and to what degree. 275 Employees generally believe the employer
holds the rights to a job, based on "its financial investments and planning
that... sustain the job. 276 Employees, however, claim ownership in their
work through their investment in "sweat equity. 277 As a result, many of the
challenges of resolving conflict in the workplace revolve around repairing
and re-grounding relationships between persons who are both highly
One concern is that because
invested in an employment position.278
workplace relationships are less permanent than they used to be, relatively
amorphous in nature and more limited in scope, the ability to build authentic
and even productive workplace relationships is increasingly poor.
2.

Legalized Employment Relationships

In today's workplace, a variety of professional relationships are on the
wane. Specifically, employees experience declining rapport with their
In conjunction, they are less involved in work-related
clientele. 2'9
community service.280 Shifts in professional connections like these are
telling. Declining rapport and reduced involvement in the needs of business
communities and clientele may illustrate an abandonment of the value of
professional service.281 Essentially, the boundaryless ethos has separated the
value of "service from the professional provider., 282 When employee
providers lose service-mindedness, an array of relationships is negatively
impacted, including relationships with customers, clients, and patients.283
"Professionals thus lose the ability to forge their own relationships with
11284
clients or to define the uses to which their skills are put ....
At the same time the quality of provider relationships is in decline, there
is "a greater legalization of the employment relationship, ' 285 which suggests
that the quality of employment relationships is also in decline. "[G]reater

275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.

Id. at 255.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 256.
See Crain, supra note 135, at 558.
See id
Seeid. at562.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 558.
Dannin, supra note 5, at 258.
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legalization... has led to... a complex array of tort and contract doctrines,
federal and state whistleblower and anti-discrimination statutes, and federal
and state anti-discrimination laws., 286 Paramount to successful relationships
in the new workplace is the ability of participants to manage this complex
web of newly defined roles in the context of an influx of legal norms newly
integrated into workplace policy. 287 Companies must observe more legal
protocol while generating maximum employee performance. Protocol often
comes in the form of handbooks, codes of ethics, office policies,
routinization, and branded service.288 While document guides have, in
reality, little to do with management of the modem relational contract
between employer and employee, they have everything to do with the
appearance of compliance, showcasing boundaryless employment principles.
The large scale integration of employment protocol into the boundaryless
work environment distinguishes the new workplace from the old and brings
with it a new set of workplace principles. 89 Problematically, the onslaught
of protocol in new work environments dismantles most of the natural rules
of the workplace, which were primarily responsible for regulating behavior
in the traditional work environment.29 ° Customarily, natural rules were
taken from society's ethical threads themselves as employees brought
community values about work into the workplace.29 1 With respect to the
new corporate environment, however, self-regulating companies no longer
internalize conventional values about work, but manage the system of
employment rules they themselves create and freely regulate from within.292
In conjunction, with the proliferation of workplace rules, an evolution of
market-driven values is underway in the boundaryless workplace.293

286. Id. at 258-59.
287. See Avery & Crain, supra note 173, at 20 (discussing two approaches employers have
taken to control and standardize service sectors, which heavily affect employees' role in the
workplace).
288. See generally Avery & Crain, supra note 173.
289. See Mitchell, supra note 21, at 944.
290. See generally id. at 944-47 (stating that businesses have "kicked out from under us the old
rules, norms, and roles that supported our social order." Further, stating that there was a dismantling
of hierarchical structures and allegiances to certain institutions as there was a transformation of new
business ideas); see generally Avery & Crain, supra note 171 (discussing how new business
approaches changed workplaces and regulation of employees); see Befort, supra note 7, at 389-90
(employers changed their practices, for example, no longer committing to giving employees longterm employment).

291. See Befort, supra note 7, at 389 ("Legal rules generally reflect widely-held beliefs and
practices.").
292. See Bird, supranote 233, at 170-72.
293. See Mitchell, supra note 21, at 946.
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Essentially, private enterprise has dismantled conventional workplace values
in rejection of a cooperative ethos.
C. Dismantling OldEmployment Values and BehavioralNorms
"In little more than a generation, the structure of American society has
changed, as an age of hierarchy has given way to an age of markets. 294
Scholars have described the old hierarchical workplace as a place where the
employer was seen as a caretaker for the employee. 295 Further: "Employees
who were good performers were virtually guaranteed a job by their employer
until retirement, the employer helped employees plan their careers and
and employees were
provided promotions to ensure career development,
' 296
loyal and committed to the job and the organization.,
Essentially, the corporate environment since World War II has been a

community-oriented system:
Beginning with the era of World War II... American employers invested great efforts in
reducing employee turnover. These employers realized that a stable workforce helped to
reduce recruitment and training costs while simultaneously boosting employee morale.
To achieve this stability, employers designed personnel policies to encourage career
rather than casual employment tenure.... [Employers encouraged] commitments 297to
long-term job security and the creation of defined paths of progression and promotion.

Union issues, notwithstanding, business culture since WWII is
historically a symbiotic, unified, and cooperative environment, even as a
closed and relatively autocratic. As the post-war middle class grew,
functional workplaces mirrored the collectivist ethos and behavioral norms
of other relational groups and group environments in the surrounding
community and broader society.298 In other words, conventional workplace

values at least technically normalized themselves to parallel values in the
home, schoolroom, and community, at times to the disadvantage of minority
groups and women. 299 As a result, the private employment contract of the
mid-twentieth century was construed as a "social contract, 300 with civic
294. Mitchell, supranote 21, at 944.
295. Marcie A. Cavanaugh & Raymond A. Noe, Antecedents and Consequences of Relational
Components of the New PsychologicalContract, 20 J. ORGANIZ. BEHAV.323, 324 (1999).
296. Id.
297. Befort, supra note 7, at 388-89.
298. Mitchell, supranote 21, at 945.
299. See id at 944, 946.
300. Befort, supra note 7, at 388-89.
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implications. With the rapid change in workplace conditions of this century,
however, "many workers are experiencing material insecurity, instability,
30 1
social dislocation, and a loss of balance between work and family.,
Some scholars suggest that "[s]ocial institutions, from business to the
family, have transformed in ways that have kicked out from under us the old
rules, norms, and roles that supported our social order and an optimistic and
generous way of thinking about the future.

3 °2

Having kicked out the old

rules, modem business enterprise has replaced "optimistic and generous"
workplace values with a new self-reliance, individualism and uncertainty
that reflect the new market economy.30 3
Arguably, even as
"[a]ntidiscrimination laws and affirmative action [have] tapped huge pools
of unrealized talent and allowed it to compete in the market[,] ' 30 4 new
groups of employment beneficiaries are still relegated to bottom-rung job
opportunities, high turnover, and rising unemployment. 30 5 Thus, a dramatic
deterioration of America's implied social employment contract is
symptomatic of the relentless nature of boundaryless corporate culture
overpowering the social order of American life with spiraling effect.
Corporate culture has been described as the combination of
philosophies, values, assumptions, and norms of an organization.30 6
Generally speaking, workplace values can be described as the ethics or
principles behind workplace norms.3 °7 Workplace norms are the behavioral
manifestations of a shared set of values used in the work environment. 30 8 As
such, norms are powerful prompts for behavioral management. Robert Bird
explains that "employment norms are perceived as law more than laws
are[]" 309 and aspects of employment such as "corporate culture, office
politics, future planning, and the complex matrix of organizational life[are] the exclusive domain of norms., 310 Further, "[e]mpirical studies reveal
that most employees rely upon norms, not laws, to define workplace
rules. 3 1 If this is true, then far greater influence flows from the company's
informal management of workplace norms than from formal employee
301. Lobel, supra note 150, at 2148.
302. Mitchell, supra note 21, at 944.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 946.
305. See generally id. at 944-49 (discussing how the change in the workplace structures has led
to instability for workers, and massive layoffs at times).
306. Bird, supra note 235, at 180-81.
307. See id.
308. See id.
309. Id. at 150.
310. Id.
311. Id.
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protocol. As a result, corporate efforts to showcase compliance can be
pursued at little expense to private practices through close management of
internal norms within a corporate culture.
Orly Lobel suggests "[t]here is the 'external culture,' which reflects how
the corporation portrays itself to the 'world,' the consumers, the public, the
market and an 'internal culture,' the life inside the firm. 3 12 This publicprivate behavior differential tends to explain how companies can model far
reaching compliance goals and still have personnel sued or arrested for illicit
behavior. 313 Perhaps the best illustration of this dichotomy is the pre-scandal
corporate environment of Enron.
1. Enron's "Culture of Cleverness

314

According to Marion Crain, the phenomenon of "ideological
proletarianization"31 5 has emasculated the professional employee in the
boundaryless workplace by restricting her professional values and purpose to
"the realm of technique." 3 16 In other words, the professional has lost her
sense of calling. 317 "With the loss of ideological control, the bonds
connecting professionals to the larger community that they are charged with
serving become frayed. 318 As a result, professional employees adapt "by
aligning [themselves] with the employing institution and advancing
institutional goals and interests rather than those of clients, professional
values and ethics, or larger societal interests., 319 Such was the employment
scenario at Enron in the wake of one of the most successful corporate
mergers in recent times. "This seventy billion dollar
3 20 company.., was
poised to dominate the twenty-first century economy.'

312. Lobel, supra note 23, at 177 (citing Jody Hoffer Gittell & James Powers, Lecture at Sloan
School of Business, MIT: Organizing Work to Support Relational Coordination (Mar. 14, 2000)).
313. Bird, supranote 235, at 179-80.
314. Id. at 180 (citing Ronald R. Sims & Johannes Brinkmann, Enron Ethics (Or: Culture
Matters More Than Codes), 45 J. BUS. ETHICS 243, 246 (2003)).
315. Crain, supranote 135, at559.
316. Id. at 559 (citing Charles Derber, ManagingProfessionals:IdeologicalProletarianization
and Mental Labor, in PROFESSIONALS AS WORKERS: MENTAL LABOR IN ADVANCED CAPITALISM
63, 172 (Charles Derber ed., 1982)).
317. Id. at 560.
318. Id. at 559 (citing Derber, supranote 298, at 173).
319. Id. at 560 (citing Derber, supranote 298, at 174-75).
320. Bird, supranote 217, at 178-79.
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As a leader in the energy industry, Enron followed a bevy of
institutional rules including a code of ethics and Principlesof Human Rights,
which were conditions of employment. 321 Yet, through a scheme of selfdealing transactions 322 and after a host of failed quasi-partnerships, 323 Enron
became indebted for millions of dollars of falsely reported earnings. Robert
Bird describes Enron's situation as:
A "culture of cleverness" [which] devolved from a pursuit of excellence to a mere
appearance of excellence through elaborate self-dealing transactions. Even with the
presence of a specific code of ethics, ethical boundaries at Enron simple eroded away in a
rule-breaking, intimidating, aggressive work environment.... Enron's implicit324corporate
culture, not its explicit code of ethics, established the norms of this workplace.

By observing the circumstances that led to Enron's demise, it becomes
clear that corporate culture drives the norms of an organization regardless of
explicit workplace codes and principles of behavior. In that light, Part IV
analyzes changes in workplace values over time in order to explain how
compliance mechanisms used by corporations have little real effect on actual
corporate behaviors.

IV.

ASSESSING A NEW SELF-REGULATING

FRAMEWORK OF VALUES

With the dichotomizing effect of rigid compliance mechanisms and
otherwise expedient corporate norms, intensive self-regulation in the private
sector has evolved into systemic self-help. 325 Through the corporate selfhelp philosophy, private enterprise has amassed the power to negotiate
governmental policy, to prevent or reduce legal liability, mask corporate
illegalities, and ignore employment protections.326 The private sector has
succeeded in amassing power under the banner of preventive maintenance,
central to which is the shifting of all economic, professional, and legal risk

321. See id. at
179.
See
ENRON,
CODE
OF
ETHICS
(July
2000),
http://www.thesmokinggun.com/graphics/packageart/enron/enron.pdf to view Enron's Code of
Ethics handbook.
322. Id. at 179-80 (citing Sims & Brinkman, supranote 311).
323. Id. at 180 (citing Catharine E. Stark, Comment, Regulating Corporate Governance:
Amended Rules of Professional Code of Conduct Allow Lawyers to Make the World a More Ethical
Place,53 CATH. U. L. REV. 1195, 1209-10 (2004)).
324. Id.
325. See Lobel, supra note 3, at 972.
326. See generally pp. 142-43.
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to the boundaryless employee.327 Employees feel the shift as a loss in
autonomy, security, and jobs.
Boundaryless companies have shifted employment norms in the new
workplace by introducing what I call negative behavior motivators into the
workforce, which undermine the employment experience. Specifically, the
new workplace implements negative motivators to diminish employees'
expectations of reliable employment. For example, there are patent
distinctions in the way boundaryless employees experience job security,
loyalty, and camaraderie in the boundaryless workplace, all of which have
been diminished in the new workplace orientation.32 8 Essentially, otherwise
qualified and productive employees are increasingly oriented, by design, not
to rely on these attributes or values which are central to building futureoriented expectations with their companies.
Employees are, instead,
internalizing new workplace values, which negatively impact the
employment experience and diminish professional expectations.
Orly Lobel provides an example: "While many law firms formally offer
reduced hour arrangements and flexible parental leave policies, these have
little effect on the lives of the lawyers employed by the firm, since the
cultural underpinning of law firms, the "culture of success," prevents
lawyers from utilizing these formal arrangements. 329
Catherine Fisk captures the rationale behind corporate encouragement of
diminished workplace expectations in her review of Levis Strauss and Nike
Corporation's recent management methods.33 ° She explains that concern for
job security is not only caused by the realities of working transience but by
greater corporate strides to ultimately outsource employment to foreign
industries. 31 Fisk reveals that "neither Levi Strauss nor Nike makes a thing
in the U.S. if you focus only on the activities conducted within the
boundaries of each corporation. 332 As a result, "[1little remains in the

327. See Fisk, supra note 163, at 840-41 (discussing AT&T's method of rationalizing its
enormous layoffs by classifying its employees as "vendors of skills" and how this "well-chosen
metaphor magically shifts all risk of economic downturn from AT&T... to its former employees.").
328. See Stone, supra note 13, at 775 (stating that there is a absence of job security and
commitment from the employers).
329. Lobel, supra note 26, at 178.
330. See Fisk, supra note 168, at 857-59.
331. Seeid.at858.
332. Id.at 857.

565
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United States except the design and marketing employees and people to
'
manage the companies' fantastically valuable trademarks."333
Today, the employer is obligated to the fictitious corporate person, the
trademark, not to the employee or even the product.334 Accordingly,
corporate loyalty is the tenor of fidelity in the new workplace, the unspoken
code of conduct.335 Nike, for example, was a company who "led its industry
in the development of guidelines for labor relations, both internally and
336
among its suppliers, with the creation of the Nike Code of Conduct.,
Nike's code succumbed to ridicule after labor exploitation issues in foreign
sweatshops arose. 337
The company blamed sweatshop-like working
conditions on the questionable ethics of foreign contractors, not on its failure
to follow its own code of conduct. 338 "As far as Nike was concerned, it had
little control over, little information about, and certainly no responsibility for
the conditions under which independent companies spread all over the world
actually sewed athletic wear and shoes.

339

As can be seen, companies are shifting workplace values away from
future-oriented employment expectations, alongside shifts in economic and
legal risk. Four overarching values in the self-regulating framework are
responsible for the shifts in risk, functioning specifically to develop
employment insecurity: protectionism, unilateralism, embedded authority,
and deterrence incentive. 341
These attributes embody the self-help
framework as counter measures against the old workplace paradigm. As
part of the self-regulatory ethos, each attribute wreaks havoc on the private
employment experience.
A.

lnternalProtectionism

In the boundaryless workplace, employees are offered employability
instead of job security. 341 Employees are re-skilled "to develop their human

333. Id. at 858.
334. Fisk, supra note 168, at 842.
335. See Avery & Crain, supra note 176, at 69.
336. Gregory Todd Jones, Trust, Institutionalization, and Corporate Reputations: Public
Independent Fact-findingfrom a Risk Management Perspective,13 U. MIAMI Bus. L. REV. 121, 152
(2005).
337. Id. at 152-53.
338. Fisk, supra note 168, at 858 (citing Brief for the Petitioners, Nike v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654
(2003) (No. 02-575)).
339. Id.at 858 (citing Brief for the Petitioners, Nike v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (No. 02575)).
340. See infra Part IV.A-D.
341. Stone, supra note 131, at 505.
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capital ' 34 2 in order to meet corporate service demands as they change in the
marketplace.
In this process, employees run the risk of becoming
instruments for corporate success.343
If the individual is seen as an instrument, even an "empowered" instrument, he or she is
there to be used by others for their purposes. Such an instrumental contract, no matter
how well intentioned or how benevolently interpreted, is a denial of democracy....
[P]erhaps the only way[] to match our needs for democracy in our critical institutions
3
4
with our need for efficiency is to think of our organizations as membership businesses.

The "instrumental contract" 345 often provides employability under the
terms of employment-at-will doctrine, which has the luxury of offering
horizontal performance promotions and creating problem-solvers with no
authority and supervisors without management pay.
Private sector
employers "ignore the fact that. . . the absence of real worker involvement
in the managerial
decision-making process generate[s] employee
346
"
insecurity.

Today's employees increasingly experience diminished job satisfaction
or low morale,347 often caused by employment insecurity. According to one
scholar:
Employees reasonably fear that suggested productivity enhancements will be rewardednot by greater firm appreciation-but by layoffs caused by the need for fewer workers.
Employees also believe that quality improvements will increase shareholder
equity and
34 8
managerial bonuses, but have no impact on basic worker compensations.

Under the circumstances of boundaryless employment insecurity, a
paradox occurs.3 49 Declining morale begins to correlate with employees'
heightened willingness to work longer work weeks, often with fewer
benefits and little chance of an internal promotion. In other words,
insecurity creates employees who are more willing to work harder even as
they are less satisfied with their work environments and receive fewer
returns on their efforts.35 °
In short, the psychological rewards of
342.
343.
344.

Id. at 505.
See Lobel, supranote 26, at 138-39.
Id. at 138.

345.

Id.

346. Craver, supra note 109, at 593 (emphasis added) (citing LESTER THUROW, HEAD TO HEAD
137-40 (1992)).
347. Id.
348. Id. at 593.
349. Stone, supra note 2, at 568-69.
350. See Bird, supranote 238, at 169-70; see also Craver, supra note 109, at 593.
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boundaryless work weaken while labor intensifies. In this environment,
employees become increasingly committed to employment goals as business
instruments, their values retooled by the policy of employability. In a real
way, the culture of employability impedes employee gratification as it
multiplies fears of unemployment in a corporate effort to generate what I
call "controlled insecurity."
Controlled insecurity defines the internal corporate protectionism that
moves employers to offer employability rather than job security.
Protectionism shields companies from employment offenses while it
relegates corporate loss to the employee who has essentially become an
employment instrument instead of a professional colleague.351 Internal
protectionism is antithetical to democratic practices in the workplace. It is
packaged in the new psychological contract as an innovative way for
instead of permanence, and fair pay
employees to appreciate job transience
35 2
instead of competitive salaries.
The reality is that private sector employees lose bargaining power under
the auspices of controlled insecurity via novel work environments,
horizontal management strategies, and threats of job loss. Losses in the
ability to bargain fairly is perhaps best illustrated by the example of "an
employee who wishes to complain about a lack of advancement in the new
environment... [but is] unsure what exactly constitutes promotion and
whether she actually has been denied one. ' 353 Clearly, "new highcommitment management models are colliding with 'the job-insecurity
reality' found in American corporations.

354

American workers are the

benefactors of the wreck that results, aptly illustrated by rising
unemployment numbers.
B.

Unilateralism

Some scholars reason that companies trending into self-regulation "need
to build commitment, not blind loyalty. 355 Generally speaking, the terms
commitment and loyalty are often used interchangeably. Yet, the two ideas
are not synonymous in the boundaryless business world. A commitment is a
vow or pledge that something will be done, while loyalty is reliability or

351. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
352. Id.
353. Berger, supra note 12, at 497 (paraphrasing Stone, supranote 2, at 607).
354. Stone, supra note 13, at 782 (emphasis added) (citing ROSABETH Moss KANTER, ON THE
FRONTIERS OF MANAGEMENT 190 (1997)).
355. Id. at 775 (paraphrasing ROSABETH Moss KANTER, E-VOLVE!: SUCCEEDING IN THE
DIGITAL CULTURE OF TOMORROW 225 (2001)).
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fidelity because something has been done. The real difference is a matter of
relationships.
Primarily, loyalty is retrospective, based on a history of mutually
validating relations.
Commitment, however, is self-directed and goal
oriented. Commitment "measures an employee's performance and...
implicates an employee's sense of attachment, affiliation, and identification
with the organization. 3 5 6 In the workplace, commitment essentially creates
an obligor/obligee relationship, whereby an employee works to reach
targeted goals as set out by the employer. Therefore, redefining the new
workplace in terms of commitment rather than loyalty minimizes ideals like
fidelity and reliability, and recasts employees as obligors in their
employment experience.
The problem in dispensing with loyalty in the workplace is that
mutuality of contract is lost and more easily replaced with the instrumental
357
contract which offers employability rather than employment security.
Mutuality of contract is best described as a mutually beneficial agreement
formed as the result of arms length negotiations. 8 Losing loyalty as a value
in the workplace extinguishes mutually beneficial agreements, which
translates into concerns for job security. The result is an obligation-driven
employment experience, which, unfortunately for employees, produces the
best managerial
environment for unilateral control over the workplace, or
359
unilateralism.
Unilateralism is used here to describe a lack of mutuality in the
workplace. Unilateralism is problematic because "[t]he essence of industrial
democracy is the right of employees to influence decisions affecting their
working lives., 360 For today's employee, however, no matter how codetermined new workplace hierarchies are, they are still functionally isolated
from centralized administrators who determine their futures. Therefore,
employees are committed to futures with no "anchor relationships," no

356. Bird, supra note 238, at 169 (citing Vincent Cassar, Violating Psychological Contract
Terms Amongst Maltese Public Service Employees: Occurrence and Relationships, 16 J.
MANAGERIAL PSYCHOL. 194, 197-98 (2001); Richard T. Mowday et al., The Measurement of
OrganizationalCommitment, 14 J. VOCATIONAL BEHAV. 224 (1979)).

357.

See Paul Berks, Social Change and Judicial Response: The Handbook Exception to

Employment-At-Will, 4 EMP. RTS. & EMPL. POL'Y J. 231, 239-40 (2000).

358. See id.
359. See id at 243-44.
360. Craver, supra note 109, at 596 (quoting R. Willis, Minister for Employment and Industrial
Relations, Employee ParticipationNews No. 3, at 8 (1994), quoted in Lord Wedderburn, Trust,
Corporationand the Worker, 23 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 203, 249 (1985)).

Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2010

47

Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 10, Iss. 3 [2010], Art. 5

definitive direction, and no voice in the employment experience. This forces
employees into "isolating roles and routines within which they are unable to
fully 36recognize
one another in an empowering and mutually confirming
1
way."

In order to diminish this isolation, some authorities recommend
providing employees with welcoming gifts, mentors, and periodic
recognition ceremonies, as ways to improve employee morale. 62 However,
these recommendations can be viewed as somewhat patronizing to the unempowered employee.
363

C. EmbeddedAuthority

"[C]ompetency-based organizations, total quality management, and
other

high-involvement

work

practices ...

define

the

new

workplace. .. .,364
These technical innovations are meant to bring
collaborative personnel together as laterally integrated work groups. With
the redistribution of office personnel, however, employees have seen the
dismantling of the career ladder against which modem "criteria for
advancement are not clearly specified ' 365 and no explicit paths to promotion

exist.
While the career ladder may be gone, corporate power structures still
exist and operate, arguably, with greater tendencies toward oppression than
hierarchical chains of command. Embedded within today's amorphous
employment frameworks are "informal and invisible power structures.' 366

When performance is the gauge for pay and promotion, and everyone is
teamed at the same or similar performance levels, motivated employees will
find ways to stand out. In this process, informal networking is used,

361. Lobel, supra note 26, at 156 (citing Peter Gabel & Paul Harris, Building Power and
Breaking Images: CriticalLegal Theory and the Practiceof Law, 11 N.Y.U REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE
369, 371 (1982)).
362. Stone, supranote 13, at 774-75 (citing KANTER, supra note 352, at 225).
363. See Stone, supra note 2, at 606-07. Stone's use of the term "invisible authority" is a
slightly different referent from my term "embedded authority" used here. I use the term "embedded
authority" to suggest that even informal factors can create authority in the workplace, such as
informal networking where men often amass most of their power base on the job. Also, "embedded
authority" suggests that while the workplace hierarchy may have embedded itself into lateral
functions, the quality of an authority hierarchy is still recognizable to employees as it exists
laterally.
364. Stone, supranote 13, at 780-81.
365. Stone, supranote 2, at 606.
366. Berger, supra note 12, at 497 (quoting Stone, supra note 2, at 525).
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particularly by men, to open informal doors to new opportunities.367
Informal networking, however, tends to enable "[s]ubtle patterns of noninteraction ' 368 and "blur[] ... lines of authority. 369 In addition, some
supervisors" are choosing to use subtle
employees and their "facilitator
"non-interaction or exclusion"3 70 behaviors in order to distance undesirable
personnel from the work process. As a result, flat hierarchies do not move
personnel up or down the career ladder, but move employees in or out of the
work group instead.
Lateral networks such as these can actually "perpetuat[e] sex and racial
segregation,' 371 and "may well turn out to be more remote and impenetrable
for women and minorities than the old power structures. '372 Stone explains:
"Clique members use the tools of ostracism, belittlement, verbal harassment,
innuendo, nefarious gossip, and shunning-tools that are difficult to identify
or remedy. And often the targets are newcomers, atypical employees, [or]
those who are not part of the old crowd., 373 These segregative behaviors
create what I call an "exclusion effect," which progresses some employees
toward success while it holds others back in a clandestine positioning for
recognition. One result of the exclusion effect is that behaviors used 37to4
ostracize employees are associated with "more than ninety-five percent"
of disparate treatment complaints filed against companies.375
The exclusion effect is also created by what is often called "first
reporting" practices. Essentially, first reporting is the practice of tattletelling in the business world, and has competitive employees feeding
workplace issues to team manager personnel sometimes called supervising
"facilitators." 376 Facilitator supervisors intercede as neutral low-level

367.

Stone, supra note 2, at 607 (paraphrasing Susan Sturm, Race, Gender and the Law of the

Twenty-first Century Workplace: Some PreliminaryObservations, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 639,

642 (1998)).
368. Berger, supra note 12, at 497 (paraphrasing Sturm, supra note 367, at 642).
369. Id.
370. Id.
371. Stone, supra note 2, at 607.
372. Id.
373. Id. at 608; see Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683,
1694-95 (1998); David C. Yamada, The Phenomenon of "Workplace Bullying" and the Need for
Status-Blind Hostile Work Environment Protection, 88 GEO. L.J. 475, 477-78 (2000).

374.

Berger, supra note 12, at 498-99 (citing Michael J. Yelnosky, Title VII, Mediation, and

Collective Action, 1999 U. ILL. L. REv. 583, 588 (1999)).

375. Id.(citing Yelnosky, supra note 374, at 588).
376. Lobel, supranote 26, at 170.
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problem solvers, whose primary goals are generally quality control,
compliance management, " and deterrence of employment claims.
Apparently, however, facilitator intervention is not working over ninety-five
percent of the time.
D. DeterrenceIncentives

For some scholars, "the new workplace is far more attuned to the
interests of the employees, '378 or so it appears. Wal-Mart has attempted to
prove that idea. Upon the creation of a "Corporate Compliance Team,"
Wal-Mart announced it was newly dedicated to "becom[ing] a corporate
leader in employment practices.",179 Wal-Mart's efforts as the world's
"largest private employer" 380 to become employee-centered have resulted in
streamlined internal compliance structures "to secure legal advantages of
self-regulation and to erect a partial shield against regulatory and judicial
intervention."'3 81 Efforts have come in the wake of multiple "legal
challenges under wage and hour laws, immigration laws, labor laws, and
discrimination law-including382the certification of an unprecedented multimillion member class action.",
Now, Wal-Mart managers receive bonuses according to their success in
hiring minority employees.383 Diversity hiring programs are examples of
deterrence measures which have led some courts away from imposing strict
vicarious liability for injury to employees in the workplace, in lieu of dutybased liability. 384 Companies can avoid liability in many instances by
showing they acted reasonably in taking due care385 in their efforts to deter
employment violations. 386 In other words, duty-based liability only holds a
firm liable if it fails to "take appropriate actions to discourage

377. Id. at 170-71.
378. Reuben, supra note 4, at 19 (citing David Wheeler & Maria Sillanpaa, Including the
Stakeholder: The Business Case, 31 LONG RANGE PLANNING 201 (1998); Rienk Goodijk,
Partnerships at the Corporate Level: The Meaning of the Stakeholder Model, 3 J. CHANGE MGT. 225
(2003)); see MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW 80-85 (2d ed. 1998).

379. Estlund, supra note 1, at 320 (citing Wal-Mart Details Progress Toward Becoming a
Leader in Employment Practices, WalMart, Inc., News Release (June 4, 2004), available at
http://walmartstores.com/FactsNews/NewsRoom/4939.aspx (last visited Mar. 8, 2010)).
380. Id. (citing Wal-Mart, Inc., News Release, supra note 379).
381. Id. at322-23.
382. Id. at 320.
383. Id. (citing Wal-Mart, Inc., News Release, supra note 379).
384. Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of
Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 687, 692 (1997).
385. Id
386. Id.
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wrongdoing. ' 38 7 Duty-based liability does not impose full sanctions on a
company for its failure to prevent wrongdoing, only for its failure to have
deterrence measures in place.388
One concern with the changing standard of care in employment cases is
the potential for "under-deterrence. '38 9 Under-deterrence results when
companies have massed great effort to impose visible compliance
mechanisms into the workplace by conducting self-reporting, for example,
with the effect of mimicking true effectiveness.3 90 Mimicking means that
companies continue to conduct prohibited behavior under the guise of selfreporting with reduced potential for sanctions after a period of observable
implementation occurs. 391
So, are employees really better off working under the self-regulatory
scheme, or do they just appear better off? All indications point to massive
corporate efforts to create a grand illusion of improved employment
practices when, in reality, change in language is the result of convincing
corporate rhetoric.
With this view, Part V explores the failure of
deliberative democracy in the boundaryless workplace and illustrates how
privately enterprised work environments are inevitable breeding grounds for
conflict.
V. CONTRASTING THE SELF-REGULATING FRAMEWORK OF VALUES WITH
CONVENTIONAL GOALS OF DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY
Many believe that democratic activity is the freedom that individuals
possess to act in their own individual best interests, and when these interests

are aggregated, laws are then made in the interest of public order. Phillip
Harter, dispute resolution pioneer, suggests that the goal of "deliberative
democracy" means a little more than that.392 Harter offers the idea that
deliberative democracy is "not just the aggregate of individual preferences,
but rather a group quest for what is the public good[.],, 393 This view

387.
388.
389.
390.
391.

Id.
See generally id. at 692-93.
Krawiec, supra note 61, at 491.
Id. at 491-92.
Id. at 492 (citing Kimberly D. Elsbach, The Architecture of Legitimacy, in THE

PSYCHOLOGY OF LEGITIMACY 391 (2001)).

392. Philip J. Harter, In Search of Goldilocks: Democracy, Participation,and Government, 10
PENN. ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 113, 121 (2002).
393. Id.
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proposes that the practice of democracy is not simply about ordering the
interests of members of a society, but about pursuing common interests that
produce the highest good. Fundamental to this idea is the premise that
democratic practices are cooperative in nature whereby best practices are
pursued in the interest of the broadest representation of stakeholders
involved, or for the "public interest. '394 In this venue, democracy is not
about order but about common advantage.395
Harter explains that baseline behavior needed for deliberative
democracy is "faithful[ness] to the essential criteria ' 396 or values determined
to be essential in any particular decision-making process.397 Participants in

the process themselves decide what values are essential to any structured
decision-making, and maintain the objective of reinforcing those values
throughout the deliberative process. 398 The deliberative process entails the
exercise of integrating essential ideals into a decision-making design.3 99

When democratic, the result is an improved environment of selfgovernment.
Such is not the case for the self-regulating corporate environment. The
boundaryless workplace fails deliberative democracy in both process and
product by diminishing natural goals of cooperative enterprise and by
advancing order instead of common advantage. The result is a set of
perverse values with which employees must function in the absence of
natural goals of deliberative democratic organization.
A.

IntegratingDemocratic Values into the Workplace

There are natural values, or goals, of deliberative democracy that are
practiced in private cooperative enterprise. Certain goals in the cooperative
business model are necessary for creating a harmonious work environment.
A few of them are: (1) reinforcing job confidence, (2) increasing workplace
satisfaction, (3) improving employment policy, and (4) optimizing
professional relationships. 400 These functions parallel democratic values of
civil society such as social connection, reciprocity, civic virtue, and public
trust, for example.4 °1 In short, cooperative enterprise is tied to improving
394.
395.
396.
397.
398.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 129.
Id.
Id.

399.
400.
401.

Id.
See infra Part V.A. 1-4.
Reuben, supra note 4, at 20 (citing ROBERT D. PUTNAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK:

Civic TRADITIONS IN MODERN ITALY, 163-87 (1993)).
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democratic values in the workplace by reinforcing job confidence and
satisfaction, optimizing sound policy, and promoting good relationships in
the work environment. The following examples illustrate the importance of
aligning the workplace with democratic ideals as they exist in cooperative
enterprise.
1. Social Connectedness Reinforces Job Confidence
Job confidence is one measure of the social connectedness an employee
feels in her work environment. "Work is closely linked to [constructs] 4of°2
agency, identity, personality, or, more broadly, of the 'self.'
Accordingly, when an employee experiences ownership in her labor, her
sense of self improves.4"3 Research has found that cooperative workplaces
create employees who increase their own ability to acquire skills in selfmanagement. 4° More confident employees tend to improve their selfmanagement skills, improving job performance.4 °5
An employee's confidence in her job performance is self-actualizing. A
self-actualized employee has labored through confidence issues and
organizational skills-building to become a more productive member of the
work environment. There is often great psychological effort involved in
achieving greater productivity and higher quality outcomes through selfactualized behavior.40 6 Scholars refer to such effort as "emotional labor. 40 7

Emotional
interpersonal

labor improves
skills

to

the degree with which

solve

problems

and

build

employees

use

community.40 8

"Interpersonal skills includ[ing] friendliness, teamwork, and ability to fit
in"409 are the result. Therefore, job confidence contributes greatly to an
employee's ability to attain healthy interpersonal skills and to build
workplace community through a necessary self-actualizing process. The
interpersonal skills attained then build social cohesiveness between

402. Lobel, supra note 26, at 139 (citing JOHN F. WITrE, DEMOCRACY, AUTHORITY AND
ALIENATION IN WORK: WORKER'S PARTICIPATION 1N AN AMERICAN CORPORATION (1980)).

403. See Hoffman, supranote 9, at 53.
404. See id
405. See id
406. See Lobel, supra note 26, at 165-66.
407. See id.
408. See id.
409. Id. at 165 (citing Philip Moss & Chris Tilly, "Soft" Skills and Race: An Investigation of
Black Men's Employment Problems, 23 WORK & OCCUPATIONS 252, 256 (1996)).

575

Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2010

53

Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 10, Iss. 3 [2010], Art. 5

employees. As described, workplace performance reflects a sense of self,
which actualizes over time to become social cohesion in the workplace.
In the boundaryless workplace, however, the expectation is that if a
prospective employee is friendly, flexible, and has a good attitude then her
work performance will be solid. Many companies interview with the goal to
"hire for attitude, train for skill."41 ° In reality, this adage is misconceived.
As described, it takes enabling an employee to self-actualize as a relevant
member of her work environment to create standing in the group and in
order for her to reach top performance levels. However, modem employers
expect that happy faces are productive hands and with the volatility of the
job market, they are not invested in the long term efforts of workplace
community-building that high performance usually needs. Democratization
of the workplace needs confident professionals at work building social
connectedness or social capital in the work environment. What companies
are not realizing is that without job confidence, the opportunity for selfactualization is lost to an employee, and work becomes less satisfying and
less productive.
2. Reciprocity Increases Job Satisfaction
Reciprocity is the degree of mutuality that exists in a relationship, and
from a collective bargaining standpoint, "a meaningful counterweight to
undeterred employer discretion[.]" 411 In the workplace, true mutuality is
cohesiveness of employment interests and benefits employees share and
employers support.
Substantial employee participation functions as a way
4 3
to generate mutuality or a shared sense of workplace values and goals. ,
Increased employee contribution in problem-solving and setting job
performance goals "increases productivity by offering an efficient way of
extracting information from [and between] employees., 414 Informationsharing like problem-solving and setting performance goals increases "selfmonitoring, discipline, and responsibilit[y]. 4 5 Moreover, a high level of

410. Avery & Crain, supra note 176, at 26.
411. Befort, supranote 7, at 393.
412. See generally Lobel, supra note 26.
413. Id. at 181 (citing James R. Lincoln & Ame L. Kalleberg, Commitment, Quits and Work
Organizationin Japaneseand U.S. Plants, 50 INDUST. & LAB. REL. REV. 39, 56 (1996)).

414.

Id. at 134 (citing Stephen M. Bainbridge, Privately OrderedParticipatoryManagement:

An OrganizationalFailuresAnalysis, 23 DEL. J. Cop. L. 979, 1010-12 (1998)).

415.

Id. at 134-35 (citing Bainbridge, supra note 414, at 1022-28).
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information flow between employers and employees also creates greater
tendency for loyalty.416

Information flow is merely one example of reciprocity moving through
the workforce. Acts of reciprocity, like information-sharing and policy
making, essentially, capture the degree of job satisfaction employees
experience in their work. High job satisfaction is arguably the greatest
indicator of a healthy work environment. When employees believe they
share the benefits involved in job productivity, then the give-and-take of
reciprocity improves the democratic forces present in the workplace.417 In
return, employers tend to experience lower turnover, higher productivity,
and increased loyalty to the organization.41 8
3. Cultivating Good Policy Promotes Loyalty
Good policy-making practices need information sharing and loyal
stewardship for success. Principled decision-making arises from input
opportunities employers offer their workforce, such as opportunities for
participation and feedback. Input is a form of information sharing, and gives
reverence to the expertise employees hold in their jobs. Input creates a
degree of reciprocity, which is a building block for loyalty.
In order for employees to garner loyalty to their workplace, there must
be opportunity for growth and entitlement to the autonomy of authority
present in an employee's work practices.419 In other words, an employee
wants to own her position, which means owning the authority and expertise
of
that come with her position. Owning expertise produces feelings
420
group.
the
in
status
legitimate
or
standing
creates
and
trustworthiness
When an employee faces conflict in the workplace and does not own
entitlement in her skill-set, and therefore, does not experience legitimate
status in her position, she may fear that addressing conflict will result in
losing autonomy or control instead of as a means to gain power through
resolution.42' Issues of entitlement are directly related to employees'

416.

Id. at 135 (citing Richard Freeman & Edward Lazear, An Economic Analysis of Works

Councils, in WORKS COUNCILS: CONSULTATION,
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 28-30 (1995)).

417.
418.
419.
420.
421.

REPRESENTATION,

AND

COOPERATION

IN

See id.
Bird, supra note 238, at 169-70.
See generally Hoffman, supra note 9.
See id. at 54.
See id. at 53.

577

Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2010

55

Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 10, Iss. 3 [2010], Art. 5

perception of standing within a group.4 2 2 When an employer extracts
autonomy from an employee's expertise in the workplace, she signals bias
and implicitly diminishes an employee's membership in the group. 423 When
an employee feels cast out of the group, she no longer experiences
ownership in the social capital being created in the workplace 424 and no
longer feels socially connected. When personnel perceive that neutrality has
been lost, they begin to see administrative decision-making as subjective and
unprincipled.425
Perceived loss of employer neutrality creates an employee who loses
faith in factual decision-making processes in the workplace.426 This loss
puts an employer's policy management in a precarious situation because the
employee begins to perceive biased treatment rather than objective, rational
policy implementation.4 27 Perceptions of bias weaken the fabric of
democracy in the workplace one decision at a time.428 Consequently, the
connection between democratic values and principled decision-making is
central to understanding where employee claims of employment
discrimination may originate. Inevitably, principled management practices
are necessary in developing integrity and garnering loyalty within the ranks
of a workplace community.
4.

Optimizing Trust Improves Workplace Relations

In his study of the relationship between trust and risk management,
Gregory Jones notes that "trust is important in a number of ways: it enables
cooperative behavior; promotes adaptive organizational forms... [and]
reduces harmful conflict.
,429
He suggests that scholars have
"demonstrated that legalistic controls inhibit the development of trust. 430 If
this it true, then legalization of workplace policies and formalized ethics
codes do little to promote trust within a corporation, and may actually hinder

422. See id. at 54.
423. See id.
424. Id.
425. Id.
426. Id.
427. Id. (explaining that "[i]f people feel that authorities act fairly in their decisionmaking, they
believe they can obey authorities' orders without fear of exploitation. By contrast, if authorities
seem to act unfairly, people fear exploitation and obedience becomes less likely.").
428. Id. ("[I]f [employees] feel poorly treated, they enter 'individual mode' and act primarily to
maximize individual short-term outcomes rather than focusing on fairness.").
429. Denise M. Rousseau et al., Not So Different After All: A Cross-Discipline View of Trust,
23 ACAD. MGMT. REv. 393,394 (1998).
430. Jones, supra note 336, at 136-37 (citing Rousseau et al., supranote 429, at 399).
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the development of trust between personnel. This fact alone, illustrates the
importance of building trust as a structural component in the workplace.
"Trust implies that contributions will be reciprocated.' 3I Thus, trust
builds cooperation. "Having an institutional foundation for cooperation
helps reinforce expectations of supportive behavior, thereby strengthening
whatever cultural traits may have led to cooperation in the first place."43
That foundation can advance social capital in the workplace.
To social law scholars "[i]t is generally accepted that trust is 'socially
embedded ' ''433 in a context and in an environment, and is "shaped by
dynamics specific to particular social settings.' '434 One such dynamic is
described as "bridging" social capital. 435 Bridging social capital is the
"social glue" that integrates or bridges cooperative tendencies from
numerous diverse groups of people toward common goals.436 These
cooperative tendencies originate from individuals who experience a
heightened sense of well being and can nurture positive workplace relations.
In other words, bridging is the result of people trusting others out of feelings
of self assurance and positive expectation. Therefore, businesses would
benefit from internal mechanisms which nourish cooperative tendencies.
The bridging process is important to a company's bottom line, as well.
Numerous scholars associate trust with economic success 437 and as "an
important correlate of stable democratic government. '438 Numerous global
studies have found "positive association between trust and economic
success," particularly between the years 1960-1993 .439 During this period,
"Americans lived in a land where natural abundance and growing

431.

Bird, supra note 238, at 169.

432.

Frank B. Cross, Law and Trust, 93 GEO. L.J. 1457, 1507 (2005) (citing Anirudh Krishna,

Creatingand HarnessingSocial Capital, in SOCIAL CAPITAL: A MULTIFACETED PERSPECTIVE 71,
76 (2000)).
433. Id. at 1504 (citing Andrew C. Wicks et al., The Structure of Optimal Trust: Moral and
StrategicImplications, 24 ACAD. MGMT. REv. 99, 101 (1999)).
434. Id. (quoting Wicks et al., supra note 433, at 101).
435. See generally id. at 1539-42.
436. Seeid.at 1542.
437. Id. at 1479 (citing Rafael La Porta et al., Trust in Large Organizations,87 AM. ECON.
REv. 333, 334-35 (1997); Stephen Knack & Philip Keefer, Does Social CapitalHave an Economic
Payoff, 112 Q.J. ECON. 1251 (1997)).

438. Id. at 1481 (citing John Brehm & Wendy Rahn, Individual-Level Evidencefor the Causes
and Consequences of Social Capital,41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 999, 1006 (1997)).
439. Id. at 1479 (citing La Porta et al., supra note 437, at 334-35; Knack & Keefer, supra note
437, at 1251).
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industrialization created real opportunities that were the basis for American
44 1
This was the period of an emerging middle class.
optimism. 440
Workplace optimism has been replaced in large part by fear in the twentyfirst century and, whether they are aware or not, companies are hurting
because of it.
B.

The Self-Regulating Frameworkof Values FailsDeliberative
Democracy in the Workplace

Cooperative workplace goals such as reinforcing job confidence,
increasing workplace satisfaction, improving employment policy, and
optimizing relationships are central to the success of deliberative
democratization of the workplace. These goals promote democratic values
like social connectedness, reciprocity, civic virtue, cooperation, and trust,
among others. The question becomes, can the conventional construct of
deliberative democracy meaningfully engage employment values as they
have evolved within the boundaryless workplace?
As described, the new self-help philosophy has created a framework of
negative values motivating boundaryless employees toward diminished job
confidence and satisfaction through unreliable policies and relationships.
Attributes of protectionism, unilateralism, embedded authority, and
deterrence initiative embody the self-help framework and entrench
democratic workplace values in a dogma of self-serving goals. Questions
abound as to the feasibility of integrating deliberative democracy into the
self-regulating corporate framework under the circumstance of such negative
posturing. But, does it make sense to devalue cooperative goals when they
are the cornerstone of an effective work environment? To diminish job
satisfaction and reward? To expect poor policy to facilitate improved
productivity? To formally deter misbehavior while privately encouraging it?
These queries have real-time answers.
1. Does the Private Sector Promote Job Confidence as a Protectionist
Work Environment?
In 2002, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, or the Whistle Blower's Act, was
passed to require among other things that securities corporations file
"internal control reports" showing financial reporting practices and

440.
441.

Mitchell, supranote 24, at 945.
Id. at 945.
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disclosing ethics codes.442 The Act also prohibits retaliation against an
employee who reports incidences of suspected illegal behavior on the part of
a publicly traded corporation. Federal protection was bestowed on "whistleblowers" after the unfolding of scandals like Enron, where internal
compliance mechanisms were not deterring unlawful firm behavior." 3
Essentially, reluctant employees needed the big stick of federal legislation
both to prompt reporting of unethical behavior and to protect against
employer retaliation after reports were made.
In effect, the observation that whistle-blowing employees must be
sheltered from their own companies by federal statute illustrates the extreme
inverse relationship that exists between corporate protectionism and job
confidence. Because internal controls were not sufficient safeguards for
corporate employees, external controls had to be exerted on pains of
criminal prosecution. In short, job security was created externally for the
corporate employee whose professional welfare was jeopardized by her own
employer. Essentially, the existence of external controls for the private
workplace is a key indicator that protectionism is prevalent and that job
confidence is likely very low.
2.

Can Employees Increase Job Satisfaction Unilaterally?

In his research on the contemporary labor movement in America,
Charles Craver used a set of examples to illustrate the kind of incentive
packages CEOs were given for jobs well done. One scenario is as follows:
Charles Technologies (CT) announced greater than expected losses last Friday, causing
CT stock prices to fall 9.6%. After CT President C.B. Wood indicated yesterday morning
that CT would immediately lay off 3000 employees to reduce operating costs, CT stock
prices rose 11%. To reward President Wood for his courageous leadership, the CT Board
of Directors voted this morning to provide him with a $3,000,000 bonus. At the same
meeting, the Board approved President Wood's recommendation that employee wages be
frozen4 44and that workers be required to assume a greater share of rising health coverage
costs.

Craver uses his example to reinforce the view that "[a]verage workers
have not shared in the success of business firms."" 5 If economic reward is

442. Krawiec, supra note 61, at 488 (citing 15 U.S.C.A. 7262 (West 2000); 15 U.S.C.A § 7264
(West 2002)).
443. See supra Part III.C.1.
444. Craver, supra note 109, at 587.
445. Id.at 588.
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the measure of high job performance in the private sector, then disparity is
clear. When many highly performing employees gain so much less earning
power from their business successes than their bosses do, then disparate
standards for success exist. If true, then employees work with a different
code for success than employers do. Too often, the difference means
boundaryless employees are working to survive while their firms work to
succeed. The problem here is that working to survive requires a very
different mindset than working to succeed. An employee in survival mode,
who perceives that she benefits so much less than her employer, likely finds
it difficult to cultivate job satisfaction on her own. It is, therefore, not
surprising that some employees choose to compromise professional
standards in order to prove their performance rather than exist in the stasis of
survival mode. They do so by opting to cross "ethical boundaries ' 4 6 and
"deliberately break the rules" 447 to succeed. Consider that this behavior is
exactly what corporations may want, and relegating employee success to
what I call a "survival code" is method to the madness.
3. Have Corporations Improved Policy Through Embedded Authority?
In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins448 a female accountant was denied

partnership in her company even though she was referred to as "extremely
competent, intelligent, strong, forthright, ....very productive, and
creative." 449 She was considered an "outstanding professional ' ' ° by many
partners in the firm. However, the committee who passed her over reasoned
that she lacked "interpersonal skills" '45' necessary to make a good partner.
Partners reported that she was "sometimes overly aggressive, unduly harsh,
difficult to work with and impatient with
staff. 45 2 One partner stated she
"overcompensated for being a woman., 45 3 Otherwise, the plaintiff clearly
excelled in competence and productivity. 54 Essentially, the firm's partners
were drawn to deny her promotion using the amorphous measure of
interpersonal skills to determine that she lacked the congeniality necessary
to be a partner.455
446.
447.
448.
449.
450.
451.
452.
453.
454.
455.

Bird, supra note 238, at 180.
Id. at 180.
490 U.S. 228 (1989).
Lobel, supra note 26, at 167 (quoting Judge Gessel).
Id.at 167.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 167-68 (quoting Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235).
See id.
at 167 (citing Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235).
Id.; Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 234-35.
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The court in this case found clear discrimination based on
stereotyping. 456 According to Orly Lobel, however, the holding "leaves
untouched the legitimacy of interpersonal requirements" 5 7 on human
resource decisions.
This oversight is particularly troubling since job
descriptions have given way to "person descriptions ''458 in the modem
workplace. Essentially, improving policy for transparency against the
backdrop of discrete power alliances is relatively enigmatic when
discrimination is a question of affability and charisma.
4.

Are Workplaces Optimizing Relationships with Deterrence
Initiatives?

Cynthia Estlund describes two occurrences in the legal arena which
impact the way corporations view protecting employees from workplace
violations, 459 sexual harassment specifically. First, over the span of two
cases, Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth460 and Faragherv. City of Boca
Raton461 the courts rewarded defendants who took "reasonable care to
prevent and correct ...sexually harassing behavior' '462 with an affirmative
defense 463 against hostile-workplace harassment suits. Second, in Kolstad v.
464
American Dental Ass 'n,
"the [c]ourt hedged an employer's liability for...
damages by establishing an affirmative defense that these actions were
contrary to good-faith efforts by the employer 'to detect and deter'
discrimination. '465
These examples illustrate the tenuous relationship
between rewarding prevention and requiring the exercise of real problemsolving in the workplace.
Typically, EEO claims for workplace violations are brought to
mediation in order to settle disputes "quickly, amicably and costeffectively." 66 A perceived problem with Title VII protection, however, is

456.
457.
458.
459.
460.
461.
462.
463.

Id.at 168; Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 257-58.
Id. at 168.
Stone, supra note 2, at 562.
See Estlund, supranote 1, at 336-37; see also Berger, supra note 12, at 541.
524 U.S. 742 (1998).
524 U.S. 775 (1998).
Faragher,524 U.S. at 807 (1998).
Estlund, supra note 1, at 336; Berger, supra note 12, at 541.

464. 527 U.S. 526 (1999).
465.
466.

Berger, supra note 12, at 541(citing Kolstad,527 U.S. at 546).
Occhialino & Vail, supra note 6, at 690.
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the view that "statutes provide protections to individuals not as workers, but
as members of a particular group.'7 This means that "employers are
prohibited only from acting in a discriminatory manner [against a particular
group]; they are not required to act on the basis of some more expansive
notion of fairness or cause., 468 Therefore, timely, amicable, and costeffective goals for the resolution of workplace disputes are not necessarily
aligned with real time problem-solving of potentially endemic workplace
issues, like for example, sexual harassment.
In sum, the new workplace does little to improve job confidence,
address policy issues, or improve professional relationships in a manner that
develops real social capital. Unavoidably, diminished social capital means
little possibility of authentic democratization of the workplace. One result is
the workplace becomes a breeding ground for conflict.
VI. UNDERSTANDING THE NEW WORKPLACE AS A NATURAL BREEDING
GROUND FOR CONFLICT

With the rewards globalization has provided corporations, businesses
are easily encouraged to maximize profit by minimizing employee returns
on their work. For example, private business entities do not have to provide
employee benefits or services, require optimal workplace conduct, or even
reduce workplace conflict. The legal treatment of most employment
contracts still allows companies to hire and fire virtually at will, 469 to offer,
or fail to offer, and even alter benefit packages at their discretion.
Additionally, companies can deny most employees jury verdicts for
employment claims through privatized dispute resolution mechanisms. And
why not? Firing an employee is typically the easiest, cheapest way for
businesses to control employment issues 470 and often the remedy companies
prefer.47 1
In short, today's work environment is best described as a corporate "as
is" contract strategy, so buyers beware.
This strategy undermines
deliberative democratic efforts, which inescapably results in the loss of

467. Befort, supra note 7, at 379-80 (citing Stephen F. Befort & Holly Lindquist Thomas, The
ADA in Turmoil: Judicial Dissonance,the Supreme Court'sResponse, and the Future of Disability
DiscriminationLaw, 78 OR. L. REV. 27, 68-70 (1999)).
468. Id. at 380.
469. Craver, supra note 109, at 590.
470. Jessica Oser, The Unguided Use of InternalADR Programsto Resolve Sexual Harassment
Controversies in the Workplace, 6 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 283, 309 (2005) (citing Interview
with Peter Phillips, Vice President, CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution, in N.Y., N.Y. (Nov. 11,
2003)).
471. See id at 308-09.
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employee rights, individual standing, and professional power over the
employment experience.
A.

Employees Have Lost Rights Through CorporateCompliance

Much of the impetus behind the self-help philosophy is a corporate
effort to "maintain[] the status quo of the organization.' 47 2 Maintaining
status quo creates a maze of conflict in the boundaryless workplace because
management efforts are opportunistic, protectionist, and self-serving.
However, protectionist behaviors are increasingly rewarded.
In the case of sexual harassment, for example, companies have been
given the opportunity to use an affirmative defense against harassment
allegations which "targets victim behavior, as well as that of the employer
and the harasser. '47 3 A corporation's use of an affirmative defense requires
that a victimized employee "unreasonably fail[s] to take advantage of any
preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid
harm otherwise. '474 The problem with this defense is the following:
Sexual harassment victims have traditionally tended not to utilize internal complaint
procedures or otherwise formally report problems of harassment. Filing a complaint with
an employer is in fact the least likely response for a victim of harassment. According to a
recent study of federal employees, forty-four percent of those who had experienced
sexual harassment took no action, while only twelve percent reported the conduct to a

supervisor or other official ....

[S]eventy-eight percent of surv respondents reported

knowing about the formal complaint channels available to them.

"Power undoubtedly plays a significant role in workplace
harassment. ''476
If true, then something intrinsic in the corporate
environment creates significant fear in reporting harassment, and diminishes
self-interest to a bare minimum. At issue here is the ability courts have

472. Amber McKinney, The ACLU and the Propriety of Dispute Resolution in Civil Rights
Controversies, 6 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 109, 129 (2006) (citing Lauren B. Edelman et al., Internal
Dispute Resolution: The Transformation of Civil Rights in the Workplace, 27 LAW & SOC'Y REV.

497, 512 (1993)).
473. Joanna L. Grossman, The Culture of Compliance: The Final Triumph of Form Over
Substance in Sexual HarassmentLaw, 26 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 3, 21 (2003).
474. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998); see Faragher v. City of Boca
Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998).
475. Grossman, supra note 473, at 23 (citing U.S. MERIT SYS. PROT. BD., SEXUAL
HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE: TRENDS, PROGRESS, AND CONTINUING CHALLENGES

13, 30-33 (1995)).
476.

Id. at 37.
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given corporations to undermine civil rights with proper compliance
behaviors.
One way corporations shift internal power is by refocusing corporate
conciliation processes toward compliance-driven outcomes. 477 When this
happens, DR processes are in jeopardy of "remov[ing] 'the focus from legal
rights to good organizational governance'... in favor of corporate
efficiency.' ' 78 These tactics have been sanctioned by the Supreme Court,
which upheld "the use of IDR [internal dispute resolution] mechanisms
before an employee can file a formal complaint of sexual harassment with
these
the court system., 47 9 Essentially, "[w]hile appearing benevolent,
4 80
processes may in fact mask a hidden agenda to maintain order.
Rules like these are part of a systemic process of shifting control from
the courts to companies, and power from the workforce to the corporation.
It is a shift which leaves employees with empty hands. As a result, the
protection of legal workplace rights evolve into management issues,
whereby an employee loses the right not to be victimized to proper corporate
governance. Her avenue of grievance is wrought with agenda-laden
outcomes toward improved managerial control of the workplace, rather than
resolution of an individual dispute.48'
B.

Employees Have Lost Standing as Workplace Citizens

Workplace democracy presumes active participation of a citizenry of
worker stakeholders.4 82 This presumption centers on worker involvement
through information sharing, decision-making, negotiating, and grieving
offenses, among other things, 483 essentially enabling a "voice to the
regulated group. ' 4 84 In the context of the workplace, "[c]itizenship provides

477. See id. at 21-23 (explaining that courts have generally required that employees show that
they first adhered to corporate policy handbook before filing complaint a sexual harassment).
478. McKinney, supra note 472, at 129; see Robert Belton, Discriminationand Affirmative
Action: An Analysis of Competing Theories of Equality, 59 N.C. L. REV.531, 540 (1981).
479. Oser, supra note 470, at 285 (citing Joanna L. Grossman, The FirstBite Is Free: Employer
Liabilityfor Sexual Harassment,61 U. PITT. L. REV. 671, 710 (2000)).
480. Susan Oberman, Mediation Theory vs. Practice: What Are We Really Doing? Re-Solving a
Professional Conundrum, 20 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 775, 817 (2005) (citing CHRISTINE
HARRINGTON, SHADOW JUSTICE: THE IDEOLOGY AND INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF ALTERNATIVES TO

COURT 78 (1985)).
481. See Grossman, supranote 473, at 21-23.
482. See Guy Mundlak, Industrial Citizenship Social Citizenship, CorporateCitizenship: I Just
Want My Wages, 8 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 719, 721 (2007).
483. See generally id. at 719.
484. Kraweic, supra note 61, at 489-90.
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a theoretical framework for tying rights with obligations, adding to the
discourse of human rights." 4"85
In this framework, deliberative participation creates employee
"standing," or the entitlement to protect interests and assert objections as a
party imbued with workplace rights. When worker involvement is not
participatory, then employees are less able to tie rights to the obligations of
their employers. Further, if employers can diminish their obligations to
employees, then companies succeed in minimizing employee standing. If
this is true, then the less often workers are able to assert themselves, the
fewer employment rights they will have to protect. 6 In today's private
workplace, for example, an employee who loses her pension plan or health
insurance has not only lost her right to a pension or to health coverage, but
has lost standing as a worker, and with it the power to make assertions
against her loss. This is the practice of at-will doctrine in the workplace. It
is the impetus for work environments of third world countries, of sweat
shops, and of child labor practices. It is also, unbelievably, a potential
reality for American employees who are becoming increasingly desperate
for employment. This reality, the reality of desperation, is the primary goal
of the self-regulating workplace and its survival code for success.
Controlling avenues and outcomes of grievance is central to achieving that
goal.
The ability to resolve dispute in the work environment is a primary
source of employee standing because the process is necessarily tied to
legitimizing employee status and to protecting rights in the workplace.
When employees have no meaningful way to grieve issues concerning their
rights, no substantive way to voice workplace conflict, then they have no
means by which to assert standing in the workplace. Diminishing standing
is not hard for a company to do.
Essentially, minimizing employee standing is as simple as the
paperwork.
[Employers] use disclaimers and signed acknowledgements in employee handbooks in
order to ensure that employees do not have just-cause employment. Employers have
imposed pre-dispute arbitration agreements as a condition of employment in order to cut
off access 4to
87 courts and, in some cases, to try to eliminate legal rights and remedies
altogether.

485.
486.
487.

Mundlak, supra note 482, at 721.
See Dannin, supra note 5, at 259.
Id.
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By institutionalizing corporate grievance processes and privatizing legal
claims with mandatory IDR and arbitration, private enterprise has
successfully reduced an employee's ability to assert her standing to almost
zero. In a domino effect, therefore, she holds no rights, no standing, and
ultimately, no power.
C. Employees Have Lost the Power to Manage Conflict
Self-regulating organizations have gained the power to "promulgate
their own rules and implement their own mechanisms to enforce these
rules., '488 "This 'shifts the locus of lawmaking activity inside the corporate
hierarchy, often with substantial consequences.'"489 As a result, corporate
policy enforcement strategies can produce a maze of conflict in the
workplace. With enough conflict, what I call a "distressed system" emerges.
A distressed employment system is generally one in which barriers to
workplace community-building, or deliberative democratization of the
workplace, exist due to systemic disparity between employers and
employees in the interpretation and exercise of employment practices. What
are generally described as natural boundaryless shifts in employment
dynamics in the modem workplace are, in reality, signs of a distressed
employment system. Some examples are employment transience, benefits
reductions, and grievance restrictions, to name a few.
Put simply, these practices are signs of systemic distress emerging from
the vacuum of democratic applications of cooperative enterprise. The few
corporate efforts in the boundaryless environment to have empowered the
worker have been industry "experiments" involved in merging private
corporate initiatives with union management, like the Saturn experiment.
Otherwise, in the words of Gary Loveman as president and CEO of Harrah's
Entertainment,
"jobs [don't] belong to people; jobs [belong] to a
490
company.
The reality that jobs do not belong to employees burdens the modern
workplace with conflict and results in surging workplace violation claims.49'
As described, it has been reported that an average of 81,000 charges of
employment discrimination alone have been filed with the EEOC each year

488.

Oser, supra note 470, at 306 (citing Erwin Chemerinsky, Decision-Makers: In Defense of

Courts, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 109, 111 (1997)).

489. Id. at 306 (quoting Lauren B. Edelman, When the "Haves" Hold Court: Speculations on
the OrganizationalInternalizationof Law, 33 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 941, 961 (1999)).
490. Avery & Crain, supra note 176, at 75 (quoting Gary Loveman, Harrah's CEO).
491. See Craver, supra note 5, at 141-42; see also Dannin, supra note 5, at 259; Kohler, supra
note 5, at 106.
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over the last decade.492 Another report illustrates that over the last thirty
years employment litigation has grown at a rate almost ten times greater than
that of all other types of civil litigation.493 One commentator added claims
filed in courts with other administrative agencies to describe statistical
growth rates at roughly twenty-three percent increase each year,494
ultimately reminding observers that distress is present and far reaching.
VII. ADDRESSING

POWER DISPARITY IN BOUNDARYLESS WORKPLACE
DISPUTE

In today's boundaryless employment environment, employees have lost
rights, standing, and an essential foundation of power in their employment
experience. In this difficult scenario, what would a meaningful mechanism
for resolving grievance in the boundaryless workplace have to look like?
What function could dispute resolution possibly play in the era of selfregulating private enterprise where employees are fungible, disposable, and
desperate? Answers to these questions are key to understanding why current
employment Dispute Resolution (DR) design is failing to resolve distressing
levels of dispute in the private workplace. The answers, however, have been
dismissed in large part by practitioners in the DR field in almost
conspiratorial efforts to galvanize facilitative DR pedagogy. Therefore,
employee's problems are two-fold: the protectionism of private enterprise
and that of DR design scholarship.
A.

Where DR Design Stands in Its FacilitativePedagogy

Facilitative mediation is the predominant method of private workplace
dispute resolution used today, for a couple of primary reasons. Facilitation
predominates, in part, because the EEOC uses facilitative process
management in discrimination cases, and the application has been replicated
into common convention.495 More fundamentally, however, is the resolve of
some segments of DR scholarship to advance facilitative mediation with
firm exclusivity. This essentially makes any departure from the facilitative

492. Occhialino & Vail, supra note 6, at 704.
493. Befort, supra note 7, at 399-400.
494. Balc, supra note 8.
495. John R. Sutton & Frank Dobbin, The Two Faces of Governance: Responses to Legal
Uncertainty in U.S. Firms, 1955 to 1985, 61 AM. Soc. REv. 794, 800-01 (1996).
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model an "oppositional[] rather than expansive" debate. 96 The irony for
Leonard Riskin, creator of the "Riskin Grid," an early discourse on the scope
of mediator influences as they exist along a spectrum of mediation styles, is
that "so many practitioners of mediation who are committed to searching for
common ground (myself included) have characterized much of the treatment
of this issue
in the literature as a debate rather than a dialogue or
4 97
discussion.

Realistically, it is unlikely that originalist DR scholars would ever
affirm alternative methodologies that depart from a facilitative DR
framework. Consequently, my overview of facilitative mediation is the
starting point in my deviation from conventional wisdom. I offer a candid
guarantee that efforts toward mediating power disparity in the workplace
will never fit the mold that conventional mediative facilitation demands.
However, in the interest of common advantage, DR scholarship will either
have to break the mold and evolve into a broader scope of public service, or
fail in its relevance. I urge choosing the former.
B. An Overview ofFacilitativeInterventions,and the UnderminingEffects
of PowerDisparity

Facilitative mediation is traditionally "a process in which a third party
' 498
neutral assists disputants in reaching an agreement that meets their needs
in order to resolve a shared dispute. It is a private, confidential, and
voluntary process that values participant self-determination as a primary
goal. Most mediation practices generally follow the strategic process of
moving disputants through systematic stages of information exchange
including, in very general terms: sharing viewpoints, discussing needs and
interests, generating options for resolution, and finally co-authoring a
settlement agreement. Few of these stages, if any, directly address issues of
power disparity and, within the general facilitative framework, were not
historically designed to do so.
Generally, "'facilitative' interventions... are focused on drawing out
the disputants' views and enhancing the disputants' communication and
mutual understanding to enable the disputants to find their own way to a

496. Oberman, supra note 480, at 777.
497. Leonard L. Riskin, Decision-Making in Mediation: The New Old Grid and the New New
GridSystem, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1, 18 n.63 (2003).
498. Ellen Waldman, The Challenge of Certification: How to Ensure Mediator Competence
While PreservingDiversity, 30 U.S.F. L. REv. 723, 728-29 (1996).
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settlement."4 99 Facilitative mediation is oriented toward parties reaching
resolution through mutual agreement; the result of assisted negotiation
performed by a process manager or mediator. Facilitation values fairness of
process, mutuality in problem-solving, mediator neutrality, and selfdetermined resolution of the parties involved. However, even in the best of
circumstances where all of the assistive attributes are present, modem
facilitative DR practices are fundamentally unable to resolve the systemic
distress occurring in the boundaryless workplace. This is so for one primary
reason: private enterprise is by nature a power-based environment. °°
"Scholars have demonstrated that informal dispute resolution is often more
advantageous to those who already possess greater power and advantage."5 1
There are a few reasons for this kind of result in today's private workplace
DR, where facilitation is failing to make headway against systemic distress.
First, external public dispute resolution programs that serve the private
sector, like the EEOC, fail to resolve distress because they are cumbersome
and limited in scope. Conventional EEO mediation takes place against the
backdrop of formal investigation and threat of legal action 5°2 with no
inherent mechanism for transforming relationships or changing behavior.
The result is a formulaic process that lacks true mutuality and is only
minimally empowering because many participants have been terminated
from employment by the mediation stage, and often remain terminated after
settlement. One report puts the number of mediation settlements that do
include503 an agreement to reinstate at only seventeen percent of EEOC
cases.

Private institutional DR practices, on the other hand, fail to resolve
distress because they diminish employee self-determination and undermine
legal safeguards. 5°4 The private sector's self-help paradigm embodies new
values intrinsic in corporate self-regulation, many of which are selfpreserving. By association, corporate designs for dispute resolution tend to

499. Nancy A. Welsh, Stepping Back Through the Looking Glass: Real Conversations with
Real Disputants About InstitutionalizedMediation and Its Value, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL.
573, 576 (2004).
500. See Hoffman, supranote 6, at 55.
501. Hoffman, supra note 9, at 56; see Oser, supra note 470, at 305; see also Lauren B.
Edelman & Mark C. Suchman, When the "Haves" Hold Court: Speculations on the Organizational
InternalizationofLaw, 33 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 941, 941 (1999).
502. Occhialino & Vail, supra note 6, at 671.
503. Balc, supra note 8,at 250-51.
504. See McKinney, supra note 472, at 129-30.
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adhere to core values of a new protectionist paradigm. Increasingly, the
private sector uses closely controlled alternative dispute resolution design to
craft internal dispute systems, which keep workplace issues firmly in
corporate command. 50 5 The reality of institutional DR programs such as
these creates a "Catch-22," whereby companies are highly interested in
resolution but wholly uninterested in deliberative processes. Because
companies may have much less invested in deliberative workplaces than
they do in controlling potential legal grievances at the corporate level,
benefits to employees are questionable.
In the end, significant increases in workplace disputes illustrate that both
public and private dispute systems have failed to curb workplace distress.
Why? The primary problem is the fact that both systems are poorly suited
for addressing issues of power disparity between private companies and their
workforces. Facilitation focuses on mutual problem-solving tasks and offers
participants arms-length, self-determined results. Yet mutuality and selfdetermination, key elements for creating a deliberative work environment,
have been removed by the boundaryless paradigm. Therefore, in a
fundamental way, facilitative DR practices are not equipped for successful
outcomes in today's mediated workplace. This is because facilitation is not
designed to manage power imbalances between parties in dispute who come
to the table without experiences of mutuality or self-determination in the
workplace.
In short, the systemic distress experienced by today's boundaryless
workforce demands an evolution in dispute resolution theory, one that
incorporates an approach for acknowledging power imbalance and
addressing issues of hierarchy as they surface in workplace conflict. Such
an approach must be power neutralizing, must integrate affirmative
experiences of mutuality, and must increase self-determination as specific
efforts of the mediation process. Ultimately, the absence of a powerneutralizing approach to private employment issues builds a provocative
case for developing new methods better able to address issues of power
disparity as improved deliberative functions of workplace dispute resolution
and with enhanced democratic substance at its core.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Years ago, renowned social psychologist Kurt Lewin put forward a
durable theory of organizational development that describes successful

505.

See McKinney, supra note 472, at 129.
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systemic change as a matter of timing.50 6 His "freeze" theory suggests that
timing is critical in intervening to make positive change in an
organization. 50 7 For example, according to Lewin, the unfreezing or thawing
of structural norms and systemic functions is the best time to impact
organizational change, alongside changes in law, politics, and the
economy. °8
America's recent economic hardships have produced an unfreezing of
economic, legal, and social mores, causing many to investigate the way
government, business, and the people interact. With this thawing, a window
of opportunity opens to rebuild the confidence of the American worker and
to create a new paradigm for managing conflict in the private workplace.
Change essential to an improved workplace will require reform of the at-will
employment doctrine, recovery of legal safeguards workers have lost to
private enterprise, and a new approach to addressing conflict in the
boundaryless workplace specific to power disparity issues. These tasks are
comprehensive in nature, requiring the foresight of a philosophical shift in
the valuation of the American workforce. Why is this urgent business? In
the words of the legal scholar, Orly Lobel, "Work has always been central to
social reform, not only because of the intrinsic importance of the workplace
arena, but because of the broader effects of workplace organization on the
society at large.,, 50 9 American workers have made this country great through
centuries of sweat equity. Now is the time to honor their work with
protections equally valuable.

506. See generally Kurt Lewin, Frontiersin Group Dynamics, Concept, Method and Reality in
Social Science; Social Equilibriumand Social Change, HUM. REL. 1, 5-14 (1947).
507. See generally id.
508. See generally id.
509. Lobel, supra note 26, at 140.
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